Mobile Clinics & Bundled Healthcare: An Exploration of Patient Perceptions of the SughaVazhvu Approach to Chronic Care Management

As the burden of non-communicable diseases increases worldwide, it is imperative that health systems adopt delivery approaches that will enable them to provide accessible, high-quality, and low-cost care to patients that need consistent management of their lifelong conditions. This is especially true in low- and middle-income country settings, such as India, where the disease burden is high and the health sector resources to address it are limited. The subscription-based, managed care model that SughaVazhvu Healthcare—a non-profit social enterprise operating in rural Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu—has deployed demonstrates potential for ensuring continuity of care among chronic care patients in resource-strained areas. However, its effectiveness and sustainability will depend on its ability to positively impact patient health status and patient satisfaction with the care management they are receiving. Therefore, this study is not only a program appraisal to aid operational quality improvement of the SughaVazhvu Healthcare model, but also an attempt to identify the factors that affect patient satisfaction among individuals with chronic conditions actively availing services.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

An Ethical and Legal Framework for Physicians as Surrogate Decision-Makers for Their Patients.

In Western industrialized countries, it is well established that legally competent individuals may choose a surrogate healthcare decision-maker to represent their interests should they lose the capacity to do so themselves. There are few limitations on who they may select to fulfill this function. However, many jurisdictions place restrictions on or prohibit the patient's attending physician or other provider involved with an individual's care to serve in this role. Several authors have previously suggested that respect for the autonomy of patients requires that there be few (if any) constraints on whomever they may appoint as a proxy. In this essay we revisit this topic by first providing a survey of current state laws governing this activity. We then analyze the clinical and ethical circumstances in which potential difficulties could arise. We take a more nuanced and circumspect view of prior suggestions that patients should have virtually unfettered liberty to choose their healthcare proxies. We suggest a strategy to balance the freedom of patients' right to choose their surrogates with fiduciary duty of the state as regulator of medical practice. We identify six domains of possible concern with such relationships and suggest straightforward methods of mitigating their potential negative effects that could be plausibly be incorporated into physician practice.