Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Improving supply chain performance: Real-time demand information and flexible deliveries

In some supply chains, materials are ordered periodically according to local information. This paper investigates how to improve the performance of such a supply chain. Specifically, we consider a serial inventory system in which each stage implements a local reorder interval policy; i.e., each stage orders up to a local basestock level according to a fixed-interval schedule. A fixed cost is incurred for placing an order. Two improvement strategies are considered: (1) expanding the information flow by acquiring real-time demand information and (2) accelerating the material flow via flexible deliveries. The first strategy leads to a reorder interval policy with full information; the second strategy leads to a reorder point policy with local information. Both policies have been studied in the literature. Thus, to assess the benefit of these strategies, we analyze the local reorder interval policy. We develop a bottom-up recursion to evaluate the system cost and provide a method to obtain the optimal policy. A numerical study shows the following: Increasing the flexibility of deliveries lowers costs more than does expanding information flow; the fixed order costs and the system lead times are key drivers that determine the effectiveness of these improvement strategies. In addition, we find that using optimal batch sizes in the reorder point policy and demand rate to infer reorder intervals may lead to significant cost inefficiency. © 2010 INFORMS.