Trust and efficiency

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We model trust as mutual, reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. We conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Evolving brand-name and generic drug competition may warrant a revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The evolution of pharmaceutical competition since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 raises questions about whether the act's intended balance of incentives for cost savings and continued innovation has been achieved. Generic drug usage and challenges to brand-name drugs' patents have increased markedly, resulting in greatly increased cost savings but also potentially reduced incentives for innovators. Congress should review whether Hatch-Waxman is achieving its intended purpose of balancing incentives for generics and innovation. It also should consider whether the law should be amended so that some of its provisions are brought more in line with recently enacted legislation governing approval of so-called biosimilars, or the corollary for biologics of generic competition for small-molecule drugs.