Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining

We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in the negotiations. We find that making public commitments provides bargaining leverage, when backing down from such commitments carries domestic political costs. However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a public demand is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome. Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for secret negotiations. Testable hypotheses are derived from the nature of the commitments and agreements made in equilibrium.

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world

Contemporary globalization has been marked by significant shifts in the organization and governance of global industries. In the 1970s and 1980s, one such shift was characterized by the emergence of buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains. In the early 2000s, a more differentiated typology of governance structures was introduced, which focused on new types of coordination in global value chains (GVCs). Today the organization of the global economy is entering another phase, with transformations that are reshaping the governance structures of both GVCs and global capitalism at various levels: (1) the end of the Washington Consensus and the rise of contending centers of economic and political power; (2) a combination of geographic consolidation and value chain concentration in the global supply base, which, in some cases, is shifting bargaining power from lead firms in GVCs to large suppliers in developing economies; (3) new patterns of strategic coordination among value chain actors; (4) a shift in the end markets of many GVCs accelerated by the economic crisis of 2008-09, which is redefining regional geographies of investment and trade; and (5) a diffusion of the GVC approach to major international donor agencies, which is prompting a reformulation of established development paradigms. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Public-Private Partnership Design for Inclusive Cocoa Global Value Chains in Ghana

Within 10 years, there could be a severe global shortage in the supply of cocoa, according to industry practitioners and other experts. Due to global population growth and the emergence of a growing global middle class, by 2025 the cocoa crop would need to increase by nearly 50 per cent to keep up with projected demand. A potential shortage of supply is a direct threat to the business model of lead firms – including cocoa grinders and processors, chocolate confectioners, and retail distributors. But these international firms – the ones that will suffer the most if there is a shortage of cocoa supply – are helping create the market failure that is stifling sustainability. Functioning as a two-tiered consolidated oligopoly with a combined market share of approximately 89%, these firms enjoy the largest portion of value capture in the cocoa-chocolate global value chain (GVC). The smallholder cocoa producers, conversely, are trapped in low value-add segments of the GVC. In fact, most smallholder farmers survive on less than $1.00 per day per capita, on average in many cocoa exporting countries. In Ghana - the second largest producer of cocoa in the world - the government has accomplished little to help these smallholders upgrade and make cocoa an attractive sector for the next generation to inherit. The result – both in Ghana and around the world – is a lack of sustainability of the supply of cocoa. Demand is already beginning to outstrip supply. As a result of these underlying circumstances, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has posed the following policy question: "Under what conditions could USAID, as a development agency, support and enhance potential public-private partnerships in order to improve the bargaining power (and financial wherewithal) of smallholder organizations and farmers in the context of the global value chain for cocoa in Ghana?"