Thermodynamic analysis of ligand-induced changes in protein thermal unfolding applied to high-throughput determination of ligand affinities with extrinsic fluorescent dyes.

The quantification of protein-ligand interactions is essential for systems biology, drug discovery, and bioengineering. Ligand-induced changes in protein thermal stability provide a general, quantifiable signature of binding and may be monitored with dyes such as Sypro Orange (SO), which increase their fluorescence emission intensities upon interaction with the unfolded protein. This method is an experimentally straightforward, economical, and high-throughput approach for observing thermal melts using commonly available real-time polymerase chain reaction instrumentation. However, quantitative analysis requires careful consideration of the dye-mediated reporting mechanism and the underlying thermodynamic model. We determine affinity constants by analysis of ligand-mediated shifts in melting-temperature midpoint values. Ligand affinity is determined in a ligand titration series from shifts in free energies of stability at a common reference temperature. Thermodynamic parameters are obtained by fitting the inverse first derivative of the experimental signal reporting on thermal denaturation with equations that incorporate linear or nonlinear baseline models. We apply these methods to fit protein melts monitored with SO that exhibit prominent nonlinear post-transition baselines. SO can perturb the equilibria on which it is reporting. We analyze cases in which the ligand binds to both the native and denatured state or to the native state only and cases in which protein:ligand stoichiometry needs to treated explicitly.

Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics

Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning, and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers, who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson's experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally, I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular moral concepts conclusion. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.