Developing a simplified consent form for biobanking.

BACKGROUND: Consent forms have lengthened over time and become harder for participants to understand. We sought to demonstrate the feasibility of creating a simplified consent form for biobanking that comprises the minimum information necessary to meet ethical and regulatory requirements. We then gathered preliminary data concerning its content from hypothetical biobank participants. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We followed basic principles of plain-language writing and incorporated into a 2-page form (not including the signature page) those elements of information required by federal regulations and recommended by best practice guidelines for biobanking. We then recruited diabetes patients from community-based practices and randomized half (n = 56) to read the 2-page form, first on paper and then a second time on a tablet computer. Participants were encouraged to use "More information" buttons on the electronic version whenever they had questions or desired further information. These buttons led to a series of "Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQs) that contained additional detailed information. Participants were asked to identify specific sentences in the FAQs they thought would be important if they were considering taking part in a biorepository. On average, participants identified 7 FAQ sentences as important (mean 6.6, SD 14.7, range: 0-71). No one sentence was highlighted by a majority of participants; further, 34 (60.7%) participants did not highlight any FAQ sentences. CONCLUSIONS: Our preliminary findings suggest that our 2-page form contains the information that most prospective participants identify as important. Combining simplified forms with supplemental material for those participants who desire more information could help minimize consent form length and complexity, allowing the most substantively material information to be better highlighted and enabling potential participants to read the form and ask questions more effectively.

Information relaxations and duality in stochastic dynamic programs

We describe a general technique for determining upper bounds on maximal values (or lower bounds on minimal costs) in stochastic dynamic programs. In this approach, we relax the nonanticipativity constraints that require decisions to depend only on the information available at the time a decision is made and impose a "penalty" that punishes violations of nonanticipativity. In applications, the hope is that this relaxed version of the problem will be simpler to solve than the original dynamic program. The upper bounds provided by this dual approach complement lower bounds on values that may be found by simulating with heuristic policies. We describe the theory underlying this dual approach and establish weak duality, strong duality, and complementary slackness results that are analogous to the duality results of linear programming. We also study properties of good penalties. Finally, we demonstrate the use of this dual approach in an adaptive inventory control problem with an unknown and changing demand distribution and in valuing options with stochastic volatilities and interest rates. These are complex problems of significant practical interest that are quite difficult to solve to optimality. In these examples, our dual approach requires relatively little additional computation and leads to tight bounds on the optimal values. © 2010 INFORMS.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.