ESSAYS ON DISPLACED WORKERS AND RESIDENTIAL MIGRATION

In this dissertation, I explore how workers’ human capital, local industry composition, and business cycles affect employment outcomes and residential migration for job losers and other workers. I first examine whether the poor employment outcomes of job losers are due to a lack of jobs that require their human capital within their local labor market. I answer this question by analyzing the extent to which the industry composition in the job loser’s local labor market affects employment outcomes when job loss occurs during expansions and during recessions. I find that if job losers reside in an area with a high employment concentration of their original industry of employment, they are 2.1-2.8 percent more likely to be re-employed at another job if job loss occurs during an expansion; I find an insignificant relationship in most specifications when job loss occurs during a recession, and in some specifications I even find a negative relationship between industry concentration and employment. I conclude that the industry composition within an area matters for job losers, since firms are more willing to hire workers from within their own industry, as these workers have more relevant accumulated human capital. However, firms are less likely to hire during a recession, making job losers’ human capital less important for job finding. Next, Erika McEntarfer, Henry Hyatt, and I examine whether the business cycle affects earnings changes for job losers, and the factors that explain these differences across time. We find that job losers who lost their job during the Great Recession have earnings changes that are 10 percent more negative relative to other job losers from other periods. This result is driven primarily by longer nonemployment lengths and worse subsequent job matches. Finally, Erika McEntarfer, Henry Hyatt, Alexandria Zhang, and I explore the extent to which residential migration is driven by job opportunities. We use four databases and find that changes in job moves explain some of the changes in residential migration, but the relationship is not as strong as previously documented. We find that migration patterns differ across databases, with some databases documenting steeper declines and more cyclicality.

Essays on Macroeconomic Trends and Cycles

This dissertation describes two studies on macroeconomic trends and cycles. The first chapter studies the impact of Information Technology (IT) on the U.S. labor market. Over the past 30 years, employment and income shares of routine-intensive occupations have declined significantly relative to nonroutine occupations, and the overall U.S. labor income share has declined relative to capital. Furthermore, the decline of routine employment has been largely concentrated during recessions and ensuing recoveries. I build a model of unbalanced growth to assess the role of computerization and IT in driving these labor market trends and cycles. I augment a neoclassical growth model with exogenous IT progress as a form of Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC). I show analytically that RBTC causes the overall labor income share to follow a U-shaped time path, as the monotonic decline of routine labor share is increasingly offset by the monotonic rise of nonroutine labor share and the elasticity of substitution between the overall labor and capital declines under IT progress. Quantitatively, the model explains nearly all the divergence between routine and nonroutine labor in the period 1986-2014, as well as the mild decline of the overall labor share between 1986 and the early 2000s. However, the model with IT progress alone cannot explain the accelerated decline of labor income share after the early 2000s, suggesting that other factors, such as globalization, may have played a larger role in this period. Lastly, when nonconvex labor adjustment costs are present, the model generates a stepwise decline in routine labor hours, qualitatively consistent with the data. The timing of these trend adjustments can be significantly affected by aggregate productivity shocks and concentrated in recessions. The second chapter studies the implications of loss aversion on the business cycle dynamics of aggregate consumption and labor hours. Loss aversion refers to the fact that people are distinctively more sensitive to losses than to gains. Loss averse agents are very risk averse around the reference point and exhibit asymmetric responses to positive and negative income shocks. In an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, I study loss aversion in both consumption alone and consumption-and-leisure together. My results indicate that how loss aversion affects business cycle dynamics depends critically on the nature of the reference point. If, for example, the reference point is status quo, loss aversion dramatically lowers the effective inter-temporal rate of substitution and induces excessive consumption smoothing. In contrast, if the reference point is fixed at a constant level, loss aversion generates a flat region in the decision rules and asymmetric impulse responses to technology shocks. Under a reasonable parametrization, loss aversion has the potential to generate asymmetric business cycles with deeper and more prolonged recessions.

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.