2 resultados para private security military company

em DRUM (Digital Repository at the University of Maryland)


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Secure computation involves multiple parties computing a common function while keeping their inputs private, and is a growing field of cryptography due to its potential for maintaining privacy guarantees in real-world applications. However, current secure computation protocols are not yet efficient enough to be used in practice. We argue that this is due to much of the research effort being focused on generality rather than specificity. Namely, current research tends to focus on constructing and improving protocols for the strongest notions of security or for an arbitrary number of parties. However, in real-world deployments, these security notions are often too strong, or the number of parties running a protocol would be smaller. In this thesis we make several steps towards bridging the efficiency gap of secure computation by focusing on constructing efficient protocols for specific real-world settings and security models. In particular, we make the following four contributions: - We show an efficient (when amortized over multiple runs) maliciously secure two-party secure computation (2PC) protocol in the multiple-execution setting, where the same function is computed multiple times by the same pair of parties. - We improve the efficiency of 2PC protocols in the publicly verifiable covert security model, where a party can cheat with some probability but if it gets caught then the honest party obtains a certificate proving that the given party cheated. - We show how to optimize existing 2PC protocols when the function to be computed includes predicate checks on its inputs. - We demonstrate an efficient maliciously secure protocol in the three-party setting.

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Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in politics and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. International crises underscore the need for the military to defend the state and highlight military deficiencies in this regard. Accordingly, major international crises lead to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years, and decades, later due to generational shifts in the officer corps. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and de-politicization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory. Major international crises lead to two waves of military withdrawal from government, years apart. Further statistical analysis finds that this effect is most strongly felt in the non-security areas of governing, while in some cases, international crises may lead to militaries increasing their involvement in security policy-making. Further, international crises that end poorly for a state — i.e., defeats or stalemates — are found to drive more rapid waves of military withdrawal from government. The statistical analysis is supported by a case illustration of civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China, which demonstrates that the crisis of the Korean War (1950-53) led to two waves of military professionalization and de-politicization, decades apart. The first occurred immediately after the war. The second wave, occurring in the 1980s, involved wholesale military withdrawal from governing bodies, which was made possible by the ascent of the "Crisis Generation" of officers in the military, who had served as junior officers in the Korean War, decades prior.