Architectural-Physical Co-Design of 3D CPUs with Micro-Fluidic Cooling

The performance, energy efficiency and cost improvements due to traditional technology scaling have begun to slow down and present diminishing returns. Underlying reasons for this trend include fundamental physical limits of transistor scaling, the growing significance of quantum effects as transistors shrink, and a growing mismatch between transistors and interconnects regarding size, speed and power. Continued Moore's Law scaling will not come from technology scaling alone, and must involve improvements to design tools and development of new disruptive technologies such as 3D integration. 3D integration presents potential improvements to interconnect power and delay by translating the routing problem into a third dimension, and facilitates transistor density scaling independent of technology node. Furthermore, 3D IC technology opens up a new architectural design space of heterogeneously-integrated high-bandwidth CPUs. Vertical integration promises to provide the CPU architectures of the future by integrating high performance processors with on-chip high-bandwidth memory systems and highly connected network-on-chip structures. Such techniques can overcome the well-known CPU performance bottlenecks referred to as memory and communication wall. However the promising improvements to performance and energy efficiency offered by 3D CPUs does not come without cost, both in the financial investments to develop the technology, and the increased complexity of design. Two main limitations to 3D IC technology have been heat removal and TSV reliability. Transistor stacking creates increases in power density, current density and thermal resistance in air cooled packages. Furthermore the technology introduces vertical through silicon vias (TSVs) that create new points of failure in the chip and require development of new BEOL technologies. Although these issues can be controlled to some extent using thermal-reliability aware physical and architectural 3D design techniques, high performance embedded cooling schemes, such as micro-fluidic (MF) cooling, are fundamentally necessary to unlock the true potential of 3D ICs. A new paradigm is being put forth which integrates the computational, electrical, physical, thermal and reliability views of a system. The unification of these diverse aspects of integrated circuits is called Co-Design. Independent design and optimization of each aspect leads to sub-optimal designs due to a lack of understanding of cross-domain interactions and their impacts on the feasibility region of the architectural design space. Co-Design enables optimization across layers with a multi-domain view and thus unlocks new high-performance and energy efficient configurations. Although the co-design paradigm is becoming increasingly necessary in all fields of IC design, it is even more critical in 3D ICs where, as we show, the inter-layer coupling and higher degree of connectivity between components exacerbates the interdependence between architectural parameters, physical design parameters and the multitude of metrics of interest to the designer (i.e. power, performance, temperature and reliability). In this dissertation we present a framework for multi-domain co-simulation and co-optimization of 3D CPU architectures with both air and MF cooling solutions. Finally we propose an approach for design space exploration and modeling within the new Co-Design paradigm, and discuss the possible avenues for improvement of this work in the future.

TAKING THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SELLER AND A BUYER: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRICE ELICITATION AND PRICE FRAMING

This dissertation consists of two essays which investigate how assuming the role of a seller or a buyer affects valuations in a price elicitation task (essay I) and how different presentations of an equivalent price affect evaluations when a consumer plays the dual roles of a buyer and a seller in transactions involving trade-ins (essay II). Sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) to give up a good is typically higher than buyers' willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain the good. Essay I proposes that valuation processes of sellers and buyers are guided by a motivational orientation of “getting the best.” For a seller (buyer) indicating WTA (WTP), getting the best implies receiving as much as possible to give up a specific good (giving up as little as possible to get the specific good). Results of six studies suggest that the WTA-WTP elicitation task activates different directional goals, leading to the WTA-WTP disparity. The different directional goals lead sellers and buyers to focus on different aspects and bias their cognitive reasoning and interpretation of information. By connecting the valuation process to the general motivation of getting the best, this research provides a unifying framework to explain the disparate interpretations of the WTA-WTP disparity. Many new purchases and replacement decisions involve consumers’ trading in their old products. In such transactions, the overall exchange may be priced either as separate transactions (partitioned) with price tags for the payment and the receipt or as a single net price (consolidated) which takes into account the value of the trade-in. Essay II examines whether consumers prefer a partitioned price versus a consolidated price presentation. The findings suggest that when consumers are trading in a product which has a low value relative to the price of a new product, they prefer a consolidated price. In contrast, when trading in a product which has high value, they prefer a partitioned price. The results suggest that consumers use the price of the new product as an anchor to evaluate the trade-in value, and the perception of the trade-in value influences the overall evaluation especially when the transaction is partitioned.

Essays in Market Design

In this dissertation, I study three problems in market design: the allocation of resources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of traffic congestion. I show how institutional and behavioral considerations specific to each problem can alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of traffic congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is effective. In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a different school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment algorithms assume resources are fixed. I show how simple modifications to these algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools. In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor markets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring firms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible to eliminate these incentives for the hiring firms in markets without negotiation of salaries. Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an efficient distribution of traffic congestion on a road network. Traffic congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory, Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would effectively be new taxes that would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to construct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigouvian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust observations in experimental economics.