Effects of Information and Time of Use Pricing on Irish Electricity Demand and Supply

In this dissertation I quantify residential behavior response to interventions designed to reduce electricity demand at different periods of the day. In the first chapter, I examine the effect of information provision coupled with bimonthly billing, monthly billing, and in-home displays, as well as a time-of-use (TOU) pricing scheme to measure consumption over each month of the Irish Consumer Behavior Trial. I find that time-of-use pricing with real time usage information reduces electricity usage up to 8.7 percent during peak times at the start of the trial but the effect decays over the first three months and after three months the in-home display group is indistinguishable from the monthly treatment group. Monthly and bi-monthly billing treatments are not found to be statistically different from another. These findings suggest that increasing billing reports to the monthly level may be more cost effective for electricity generators who wish to decrease expenses and consumption, rather than providing in-home displays. In the following chapter, I examine the response of residential households after exposure to time of use tariffs at different hours of the day. I find that these treatments reduce electricity consumption during peak hours by almost four percent, significantly lowering demand. Within the model, I find evidence of overall conservation in electricity used. In addition, weekday peak reductions appear to carry over to the weekend when peak pricing is not present, suggesting changes in consumer habit. The final chapter of my dissertation imposes a system wide time of use plan to analyze the potential reduction in carbon emissions from load shifting based on the Ireland and Northern Single Electricity Market. I find that CO2 emissions savings are highest during the winter months when load demand is highest and dirtier power plants are scheduled to meet peak demand. TOU pricing allows for shifting in usage from peak usage to off peak usage and this shift in load can be met with cleaner and cheaper generated electricity from imports, high efficiency gas units, and hydro units.

Essays on Market Frictions and Securitization

This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.

Essays in Market Design

In this dissertation, I study three problems in market design: the allocation of resources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of traffic congestion. I show how institutional and behavioral considerations specific to each problem can alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of traffic congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is effective. In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a different school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment algorithms assume resources are fixed. I show how simple modifications to these algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools. In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor markets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring firms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible to eliminate these incentives for the hiring firms in markets without negotiation of salaries. Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an efficient distribution of traffic congestion on a road network. Traffic congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory, Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would effectively be new taxes that would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to construct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigouvian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust observations in experimental economics.