Vehicle Routing Problems that Minimize the Completion Time: Heuristics, Worst-Case Analyses, and Computational Results

In the standard Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP), we route a fleet of vehicles to deliver the demands of all customers such that the total distance traveled by the fleet is minimized. In this dissertation, we study variants of the VRP that minimize the completion time, i.e., we minimize the distance of the longest route. We call it the min-max objective function. In applications such as disaster relief efforts and military operations, the objective is often to finish the delivery or the task as soon as possible, not to plan routes with the minimum total distance. Even in commercial package delivery nowadays, companies are investing in new technologies to speed up delivery instead of focusing merely on the min-sum objective. In this dissertation, we compare the min-max and the standard (min-sum) objective functions in a worst-case analysis to show that the optimal solution with respect to one objective function can be very poor with respect to the other. The results motivate the design of algorithms specifically for the min-max objective. We study variants of min-max VRPs including one problem from the literature (the min-max Multi-Depot VRP) and two new problems (the min-max Split Delivery Multi-Depot VRP with Minimum Service Requirement and the min-max Close-Enough VRP). We develop heuristics to solve these three problems. We compare the results produced by our heuristics to the best-known solutions in the literature and find that our algorithms are effective. In the case where benchmark instances are not available, we generate instances whose near-optimal solutions can be estimated based on geometry. We formulate the Vehicle Routing Problem with Drones and carry out a theoretical analysis to show the maximum benefit from using drones in addition to trucks to reduce delivery time. The speed-up ratio depends on the number of drones loaded onto one truck and the speed of the drone relative to the speed of the truck.

Understanding information use in multiattribute decision making

An inference task in one in which some known set of information is used to produce an estimate about an unknown quantity. Existing theories of how humans make inferences include specialized heuristics that allow people to make these inferences in familiar environments quickly and without unnecessarily complex computation. Specialized heuristic processing may be unnecessary, however; other research suggests that the same patterns in judgment can be explained by existing patterns in encoding and retrieving memories. This dissertation compares and attempts to reconcile three alternate explanations of human inference. After justifying three hierarchical Bayesian version of existing inference models, the three models are com- pared on simulated, observed, and experimental data. The results suggest that the three models capture different patterns in human behavior but, based on posterior prediction using laboratory data, potentially ignore important determinants of the decision process.

THE PHYSICS OF IDEAS: INFERRING THE MECHANICS OF OPINION FORMATION FROM MACROSCOPIC STATISTICAL PATTERNS

In a microscopic setting, humans behave in rich and unexpected ways. In a macroscopic setting, however, distinctive patterns of group behavior emerge, leading statistical physicists to search for an underlying mechanism. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the macroscopic patterns of competing ideas in order to discern the mechanics of how group opinions form at the microscopic level. First, we explore the competition of answers in online Q&A (question and answer) boards. We find that a simple individual-level model can capture important features of user behavior, especially as the number of answers to a question grows. Our model further suggests that the wisdom of crowds may be constrained by information overload, in which users are unable to thoroughly evaluate each answer and therefore tend to use heuristics to pick what they believe is the best answer. Next, we explore models of opinion spread among voters to explain observed universal statistical patterns such as rescaled vote distributions and logarithmic vote correlations. We introduce a simple model that can explain both properties, as well as why it takes so long for large groups to reach consensus. An important feature of the model that facilitates agreement with data is that individuals become more stubborn (unwilling to change their opinion) over time. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms for opinion formation in juries, by comparing data to various types of models. We find that different null hypotheses in which jurors do not interact when reaching a decision are in strong disagreement with data compared to a simple interaction model. These findings provide conceptual and mechanistic support for previous work that has found mutual influence can play a large role in group decisions. In addition, by matching our models to data, we are able to infer the time scales over which individuals change their opinions for different jury contexts. We find that these values increase as a function of the trial time, suggesting that jurors and judicial panels exhibit a kind of stubbornness similar to what we include in our model of voting behavior.

Computational Analysis of Intelligent Agents: Social and Strategic Settings

The central motif of this work is prediction and optimization in presence of multiple interacting intelligent agents. We use the phrase `intelligent agents' to imply in some sense, a `bounded rationality', the exact meaning of which varies depending on the setting. Our agents may not be `rational' in the classical game theoretic sense, in that they don't always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is natural for human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. Within this broad framework we study the problem of influence maximization in social networks where behavior of agents is myopic, but complication stems from the structure of interaction networks. In this setting, we generalize two well-known models and give new algorithms and hardness results for our models. Then we move on to models where the agents reason strategically but are faced with considerable uncertainty. For such games, we give a new solution concept and analyze a real-world game using out techniques. Finally, the richest model we consider is that of Network Cournot Competition which deals with strategic resource allocation in hypergraphs, where agents reason strategically and their interaction is specified indirectly via player's utility functions. For this model, we give the first equilibrium computability results. In all of the above problems, we assume that payoffs for the agents are known. However, for real-world games, getting the payoffs can be quite challenging. To this end, we also study the inverse problem of inferring payoffs, given game history. We propose and evaluate a data analytic framework and we show that it is fast and performant.

Mathematical Programming Models for Influence Maximization on Social Networks

In this dissertation, we apply mathematical programming techniques (i.e., integer programming and polyhedral combinatorics) to develop exact approaches for influence maximization on social networks. We study four combinatorial optimization problems that deal with maximizing influence at minimum cost over a social network. To our knowl- edge, all previous work to date involving influence maximization problems has focused on heuristics and approximation. We start with the following viral marketing problem that has attracted a significant amount of interest from the computer science literature. Given a social network, find a target set of customers to seed with a product. Then, a cascade will be caused by these initial adopters and other people start to adopt this product due to the influence they re- ceive from earlier adopters. The idea is to find the minimum cost that results in the entire network adopting the product. We first study a problem called the Weighted Target Set Selection (WTSS) Prob- lem. In the WTSS problem, the diffusion can take place over as many time periods as needed and a free product is given out to the individuals in the target set. Restricting the number of time periods that the diffusion takes place over to be one, we obtain a problem called the Positive Influence Dominating Set (PIDS) problem. Next, incorporating partial incentives, we consider a problem called the Least Cost Influence Problem (LCIP). The fourth problem studied is the One Time Period Least Cost Influence Problem (1TPLCIP) which is identical to the LCIP except that we restrict the number of time periods that the diffusion takes place over to be one. We apply a common research paradigm to each of these four problems. First, we work on special graphs: trees and cycles. Based on the insights we obtain from special graphs, we develop efficient methods for general graphs. On trees, first, we propose a polynomial time algorithm. More importantly, we present a tight and compact extended formulation. We also project the extended formulation onto the space of the natural vari- ables that gives the polytope on trees. Next, building upon the result for trees---we derive the polytope on cycles for the WTSS problem; as well as a polynomial time algorithm on cycles. This leads to our contribution on general graphs. For the WTSS problem and the LCIP, using the observation that the influence propagation network must be a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the strong formulation for trees can be embedded into a formulation on general graphs. We use this to design and implement a branch-and-cut approach for the WTSS problem and the LCIP. In our computational study, we are able to obtain high quality solutions for random graph instances with up to 10,000 nodes and 20,000 edges (40,000 arcs) within a reasonable amount of time.