An Exorbitant Privilege in the First Age of International Financial Integration

The exorbitant privilege literature analyzes the positive differential returns on net foreign assets enjoyed by the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century as the issuer of the global reserve currency. In the first age of international financial integration (1870-1914), the global reserve currency of the period was the British pound sterling. Whether the United Kingdom enjoyed a similar privilege is analyzed with a new dataset, encompassing microdata on railroad and government financial securities. The use of microdata avoids the flaws that have plagued the US studies, particularly the use of incompatible aggregate variables. New measures of Britain’s net external position provide estimates on capital gains and dividend yields. As the issuer of the global reserve currency, Britain received average revenues of 13.4% of GDP from its international investment position. The country satisfied the necessary condition for the existence of an exorbitant privilege. Nonetheless, Britain’s case is slightly different from the American one. British external assets received higher returns than were paid on external liabilities for each class, but British invested mostly in securities with low profile of risk. The low return on its net external position meant that, for most of the time, Britain would not receive positive revenues from the rest of the world if it were a net debtor country, but this pattern changed after 1900. The finding supports the claim that, at least partially, exorbitant privilege is a general characteristic of the issuer of the global reserve currency and not unique to the late twentieth century US.

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.