Mission and Scenario Planning for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Path Planning and Collision Avoidance Systems)

As unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) are being widely utilized in military and civil applications, concerns are growing about mission safety and how to integrate dierent phases of mission design. One important barrier to a coste ective and timely safety certication process for UAVs is the lack of a systematic approach for bridging the gap between understanding high-level commander/pilot intent and implementation of intent through low-level UAV behaviors. In this thesis we demonstrate an entire systems design process for a representative UAV mission, beginning from an operational concept and requirements and ending with a simulation framework for segments of the mission design, such as path planning and decision making in collision avoidance. In this thesis, we divided this complex system into sub-systems; path planning, collision detection and collision avoidance. We then developed software modules for each sub-system

Motion Planning and Controls with Safety and Temporal Constraints

Motion planning, or trajectory planning, commonly refers to a process of converting high-level task specifications into low-level control commands that can be executed on the system of interest. For different applications, the system will be different. It can be an autonomous vehicle, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(UAV), a humanoid robot, or an industrial robotic arm. As human machine interaction is essential in many of these systems, safety is fundamental and crucial. Many of the applications also involve performing a task in an optimal manner within a given time constraint. Therefore, in this thesis, we focus on two aspects of the motion planning problem. One is the verification and synthesis of the safe controls for autonomous ground and air vehicles in collision avoidance scenarios. The other part focuses on the high-level planning for the autonomous vehicles with the timed temporal constraints. In the first aspect of our work, we first propose a verification method to prove the safety and robustness of a path planner and the path following controls based on reachable sets. We demonstrate the method on quadrotor and automobile applications. Secondly, we propose a reachable set based collision avoidance algorithm for UAVs. Instead of the traditional approaches of collision avoidance between trajectories, we propose a collision avoidance scheme based on reachable sets and tubes. We then formulate the problem as a convex optimization problem seeking control set design for the aircraft to avoid collision. We apply our approach to collision avoidance scenarios of quadrotors and fixed-wing aircraft. In the second aspect of our work, we address the high level planning problems with timed temporal logic constraints. Firstly, we present an optimization based method for path planning of a mobile robot subject to timed temporal constraints, in a dynamic environment. Temporal logic (TL) can address very complex task specifications such as safety, coverage, motion sequencing etc. We use metric temporal logic (MTL) to encode the task specifications with timing constraints. We then translate the MTL formulae into mixed integer linear constraints and solve the associated optimization problem using a mixed integer linear program solver. We have applied our approach on several case studies in complex dynamical environments subjected to timed temporal specifications. Secondly, we also present a timed automaton based method for planning under the given timed temporal logic specifications. We use metric interval temporal logic (MITL), a member of the MTL family, to represent the task specification, and provide a constructive way to generate a timed automaton and methods to look for accepting runs on the automaton to find an optimal motion (or path) sequence for the robot to complete the task.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).