Interorganizational Innovation: The Role of Suppliers in Enhancing Buyer Innovation

This dissertation explores the effect of innovative knowledge transfer across supply chain partners. My research seeks to understand the manner by which a firm is able to benefit from the innovative capabilities of its supply chain partners and utilize the external knowledge they hold to increase its own levels of innovation. Specifically, I make use of patent data as a proxy for firm-level innovation and develop both independent and dependent variables from the data contained within the patent filings. I further examine the means by which key dyadic and portfolio supply chain relationship characteristics moderate the relationship between supplier innovation and buyer innovation. I investigate factors such as the degree of transactional reciprocity between the buyer and supplier, the similarity of the firms’ knowledge bases, and specific chain characteristics (e.g., geographic propinquity) to provide greater understanding of the means by which the transfer of innovative knowledge across firms in a supply chain can be enhanced or inhibited. This dissertation spans three essays to provide insights into the role that supply chain relationships play in affecting a focal firm’s level of innovation. While innovation has been at the core of a wide body of research, very little empirical work exists that considers the role of vertical buyer-supplier relationships on a firm’s ability to develop new and novel innovations. I begin by considering the fundamental unit of analysis within a supply chain, the buyer-supplier dyad. After developing initial insights based on the interactions between singular buyers and suppliers, essay two extends the analysis to consider the full spectrum of a buyer’s supply base by aggregating the individual buyer-supplier dyad level data into firm-supply network level data. Through this broader level of analysis, I am able to examine how the relational characteristics between a buyer firm and its supply base affect its ability to leverage the full portfolio of its suppliers’ innovative knowledge. Finally, in essay three I further extend the analysis to explore the means by which a buyer firm can use its suppliers to enhance its ability to access distant knowledge held by other organizations that the buyer is only connected to indirectly through its suppliers.

TAKING THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SELLER AND A BUYER: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRICE ELICITATION AND PRICE FRAMING

This dissertation consists of two essays which investigate how assuming the role of a seller or a buyer affects valuations in a price elicitation task (essay I) and how different presentations of an equivalent price affect evaluations when a consumer plays the dual roles of a buyer and a seller in transactions involving trade-ins (essay II). Sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) to give up a good is typically higher than buyers' willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain the good. Essay I proposes that valuation processes of sellers and buyers are guided by a motivational orientation of “getting the best.” For a seller (buyer) indicating WTA (WTP), getting the best implies receiving as much as possible to give up a specific good (giving up as little as possible to get the specific good). Results of six studies suggest that the WTA-WTP elicitation task activates different directional goals, leading to the WTA-WTP disparity. The different directional goals lead sellers and buyers to focus on different aspects and bias their cognitive reasoning and interpretation of information. By connecting the valuation process to the general motivation of getting the best, this research provides a unifying framework to explain the disparate interpretations of the WTA-WTP disparity. Many new purchases and replacement decisions involve consumers’ trading in their old products. In such transactions, the overall exchange may be priced either as separate transactions (partitioned) with price tags for the payment and the receipt or as a single net price (consolidated) which takes into account the value of the trade-in. Essay II examines whether consumers prefer a partitioned price versus a consolidated price presentation. The findings suggest that when consumers are trading in a product which has a low value relative to the price of a new product, they prefer a consolidated price. In contrast, when trading in a product which has high value, they prefer a partitioned price. The results suggest that consumers use the price of the new product as an anchor to evaluate the trade-in value, and the perception of the trade-in value influences the overall evaluation especially when the transaction is partitioned.

Essays on Supply Chain Finance

I study how a larger party within a supply chain could use its superior knowledge about its partner, who is considered to be financially constrained, to help its partner gain access to cheap finance. In particular, I consider two scenarios: (i) Retailer intermediation in supplier finance and (ii) The Effectiveness of Supplier Buy Back Finance. In the fist chapter, I study how a large buyer could help small suppliers obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. In order to reduce channel costs, in recent years large buyers started to implement their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, I analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, I show that buyer intermediated financing can significantly improve supply chain performance. Using data from a large Chinese online retailer and through structural regression estimation based on the theoretical analysis, I demonstrate that buyer intermediation induces lower interest rates and wholesale prices, increases order quantities, and boosts supplier borrowing. The analysis also shows that the retailer systematically overestimates the consumer demand. Based on counterfactual analysis, I predict that the implementation of buyer intermediated financing for the online retailer in 2013 improved channel profits by 18.3%, yielding more than $68M projected savings. In the second chapter, I study a novel buy-back financing scheme employed by large manufacturers in some emerging markets. A large manufacturer can secure financing for its budget-constrained downstream partners by assuming a part of the risk for their inventory by committing to buy back some unsold units. Buy back commitment could help a small downstream party secure a bank loan and further induce a higher order quantity through better allocation of risk in the supply chain. However, such a commitment may undermine the supply chain performance as it imposes extra costs on the supplier incurred by the return of large or costly-to-handle items. I first theoretically analyze the buy-back financing contract employed by a leading Chinese automative manufacturer and some variants of this contracting scheme. In order to measure the effectiveness of buy-back financing contracts, I utilize contract and sales data from the company and structurally estimate the theoretical model. Through counterfactual analysis, I study the efficiency of various buy-back financing schemes and compare them to traditional financing methods. I find that buy-back contract agreements can improve channel efficiency significantly compared to simple contracts with no buy-back, whether the downstream retailer can secure financing on its own or not.