Industry Linkages and Audit Firms' Industry Portfolio Choice: Evidence from Product Language

Audit firms are organized along industry lines and industry specialization is a prominent feature of the audit market. Yet, we know little about how audit firms make their industry portfolio decisions, i.e., how audit firms decide which set of industries to specialize in. In this study, I examine how the linkages between industries in the product space affect audit firms’ industry portfolio choice. Using text-based product space measures to capture these industry linkages, I find that both Big 4 and small audit firms tend to specialize in industry-pairs that 1) are close to each other in the product space (i.e., have more similar product language) and 2) have a greater number of “between-industries” in the product space (i.e., have a greater number of industries with product language that is similar to both industries in the pair). Consistent with the basic tradeoff between specialization and coordination, these results suggest that specializing in industries that have more similar product language and more linkages to other industries in the product space allow audit firms greater flexibility to transfer industry-specific expertise across industries as well as greater mobility in the product space, hence enhancing its competitive advantage. Additional analysis using the collapse of Arthur Andersen as an exogenous supply shock in the audit market finds consistent results. Taken together, the findings suggest that industry linkages in the product space play an important role in shaping the audit market structure.

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.