STORYTELLING, EMOTION UNDERSTANDING, AND KINDERGARTNERS’ SOCIAL COMPETENCE

Interpreting others’ emotions is theoretically foundational for children’s social competence, yet little research contrasts Emotion Understanding (EU) types against their theoretical correlates. This study investigated kindergartners’ situationistic EU (attributing emotions based on external events) and mentalistic EU (attributing emotions from others’ mental states) in relation to Theory of Mind (ToM) and social skills, as rated by parents and teachers. The EU measures were expected to have low associations with one another and to relate differently to ToM and select social skills. Mentalistic EU was expected to be an important predictor of teacher-rated social skills. Results supported the hypothesis that mentalistic EU and situationistic EU are distinct constructs. However, both relate to ToM. Furthermore, while ToM and situationistic EU variables were included in the regression model, only vocabulary and mentalistic EU were significant predictors for teacher-rated social skills. Results indicate the importance of mentalistic EU in aspects of kindergartners’ social competence.

Developmental Neural Correlates of Social Interaction

Children develop in a sea of reciprocal social interaction, but their brain development is predominately studied in non-interactive contexts (e.g., viewing photographs of faces). This dissertation investigated how the developing brain supports social interaction. Specifically, novel paradigms were used to target two facets of social experience—social communication and social motivation—across three studies in children and adults. In Study 1, adults listened to short vignettes—which contained no social information—that they believed to be either prerecorded or presented over an audio-feed by a live social partner. Simply believing that speech was from a live social partner increased activation in the brain’s mentalizing network—a network involved in thinking about others’ thoughts. Study 2 extended this paradigm to middle childhood, a time of increasing social competence and social network complexity, as well as structural and functional social brain development. Results showed that, as in adults, regions of the mentalizing network were engaged by live speech. Taken together, these findings indicate that the mentalizing network may support the processing of interactive communicative cues across development. Given this established importance of social-interactive context, Study 3 examined children’s social motivation when they believed they were engaged in a computer-based chat with a peer. Children initiated interaction via sharing information about their likes and hobbies and received responses from the peer. Compared to a non-social control, in which children chatted with a computer, peer interaction increased activation in mentalizing regions and reward circuitry. Further, within mentalizing regions, responsivity to the peer increased with age. Thus, across all three studies, social cognitive regions associated with mentalizing supported real-time social interaction. In contrast, the specific social context appeared to influence both reward circuitry involvement and age-related changes in neural activity. Future studies should continue to examine how the brain supports interaction across varied real-world social contexts. In addition to illuminating typical development, understanding the neural bases of interaction will offer insight into social disabilities such as autism, where social difficulties are often most acute in interactive situations. Ultimately, to best capture human experience, social neuroscience ought to be embedded in the social world.