HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies thus increases, but the alliance endures. I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s demonstrates successful use of a strategy of delay that appeases a dissatisfied member.

Turkish Security Policymaking on Nuclear Issues: Conceptualizing Advanced Cooperative Security Strategies

Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. As the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member that has a border with the Middle East, Turkish officials argue that Turkey cannot solely rely on NATO guarantees in addressing the regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been able to formulate a security policy that reconciles its quest for independence, its NATO membership, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional engagement in the Middle East. This dissertation assesses the strategic implications of Turkey’s perceptions of the U.S./NATO nuclear and conventional deterrence on nuclear issues. It explores three case studies by the process tracing of Turkish policymakers’ nuclear-related decisions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, national air and missile defense, and Iran’s nuclear program. The study finds that the principles of Turkish security policymaking do not incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have a defining role in Turkish security and defense strategy. The decisions are mainly guided by non-nuclear considerations such as Alliance politics, modernization of the domestic defense industry, and regional influence. The dissertation argues that Turkey could formulate more effective and less risky security policies on nuclear issues by emphasizing the cooperative security approaches within the NATO Alliance over confrontational measures. The findings of this dissertation reveal that a major transformation of Turkish security policymaking is required to end the crisis of confidence with NATO, redefinition of the strategic partnership with the US, and a more cautious approach toward the Middle East. The dissertation argues that Turkey should promote proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats, as well as contribute to developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty.