NONDISCLOSURE – A GOOD NEWS SIGNAL?

I examine the implications of nondisclosure in a setting where there is a credible signal as to the proprietary nature of the undisclosed information. Specifically, I investigate the market and analysts' response to firms’ application to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a confidential treatment order (CTO), which allows firms to redact required disclosures from SEC filings when the redacted information is proprietary. I find that the market and analysts react favorably to the voluntary nondisclosure of proprietary information using the SEC confidential treatment process. Market and analysts reactions are more favorable to the redaction of information that is more likely to have proprietary value, such as information related to research and development. In addition, I show that the redacting firms experience superior accounting performance compared to their peers in the years following the redaction, consistent with the market and analysts’ response to the redaction. However, I find that analysts engage in more intense private information search in response to a CTO redaction. This finding suggests that, although a CTO redaction can signal the nature of undisclosed information, analysts believe that the signal is not fully revealing of the economic magnitude of the undisclosed information. Overall, this study’s findings indicate that a firm's willingness to submit to the CTO approval process serves as a credible signal of the proprietary nature of the withheld information. The results of this study suggest a possible role for a credible signaling channel to facilitate communication between insiders and outsiders regarding the nature of withheld information.

An Exorbitant Privilege in the First Age of International Financial Integration

The exorbitant privilege literature analyzes the positive differential returns on net foreign assets enjoyed by the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century as the issuer of the global reserve currency. In the first age of international financial integration (1870-1914), the global reserve currency of the period was the British pound sterling. Whether the United Kingdom enjoyed a similar privilege is analyzed with a new dataset, encompassing microdata on railroad and government financial securities. The use of microdata avoids the flaws that have plagued the US studies, particularly the use of incompatible aggregate variables. New measures of Britain’s net external position provide estimates on capital gains and dividend yields. As the issuer of the global reserve currency, Britain received average revenues of 13.4% of GDP from its international investment position. The country satisfied the necessary condition for the existence of an exorbitant privilege. Nonetheless, Britain’s case is slightly different from the American one. British external assets received higher returns than were paid on external liabilities for each class, but British invested mostly in securities with low profile of risk. The low return on its net external position meant that, for most of the time, Britain would not receive positive revenues from the rest of the world if it were a net debtor country, but this pattern changed after 1900. The finding supports the claim that, at least partially, exorbitant privilege is a general characteristic of the issuer of the global reserve currency and not unique to the late twentieth century US.