Identification and assessment of potential wind energy project sites in the State of Maryland

Gemstone Team Renewables

An Exorbitant Privilege in the First Age of International Financial Integration

The exorbitant privilege literature analyzes the positive differential returns on net foreign assets enjoyed by the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century as the issuer of the global reserve currency. In the first age of international financial integration (1870-1914), the global reserve currency of the period was the British pound sterling. Whether the United Kingdom enjoyed a similar privilege is analyzed with a new dataset, encompassing microdata on railroad and government financial securities. The use of microdata avoids the flaws that have plagued the US studies, particularly the use of incompatible aggregate variables. New measures of Britain’s net external position provide estimates on capital gains and dividend yields. As the issuer of the global reserve currency, Britain received average revenues of 13.4% of GDP from its international investment position. The country satisfied the necessary condition for the existence of an exorbitant privilege. Nonetheless, Britain’s case is slightly different from the American one. British external assets received higher returns than were paid on external liabilities for each class, but British invested mostly in securities with low profile of risk. The low return on its net external position meant that, for most of the time, Britain would not receive positive revenues from the rest of the world if it were a net debtor country, but this pattern changed after 1900. The finding supports the claim that, at least partially, exorbitant privilege is a general characteristic of the issuer of the global reserve currency and not unique to the late twentieth century US.

Essays on Uncertainty, Imperfect Information, and Investment Dynamics

Understanding how imperfect information affects firms' investment decision helps answer important questions in economics, such as how we may better measure economic uncertainty; how firms' forecasts would affect their decision-making when their beliefs are not backed by economic fundamentals; and how important are the business cycle impacts of changes in firms' productivity uncertainty in an environment of incomplete information. This dissertation provides a synthetic answer to all these questions, both empirically and theoretically. The first chapter, provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that survey-based forecast dispersion identifies a distinctive type of second moment shocks different from the canonical volatility shocks to productivity, i.e. uncertainty shocks. Such forecast disagreement disturbances can affect the distribution of firm-level beliefs regardless of whether or not belief changes are backed by changes in economic fundamentals. At the aggregate level, innovations that increase the dispersion of firms' forecasts lead to persistent declines in aggregate investment and output, which are followed by a slow recovery. On the contrary, the larger dispersion of future firm-specific productivity innovations, the standard way to measure economic uncertainty, delivers the ``wait and see" effect, such that aggregate investment experiences a sharp decline, followed by a quick rebound, and then overshoots. At the firm level, data uncovers that more productive firms increase investments given rises in productivity dispersion for the future, whereas investments drop when firms disagree more about the well-being of their future business conditions. These findings challenge the view that the dispersion of the firms' heterogeneous beliefs captures the concept of economic uncertainty, defined by a model of uncertainty shocks. The second chapter presents a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms subject to the real productivity uncertainty shocks and informational disagreement shocks. As firms cannot perfectly disentangle aggregate from idiosyncratic productivity because of imperfect information, information quality thus drives the wedge of difference between the unobserved productivity fundamentals, and the firms' beliefs about how productive they are. Distribution of the firms' beliefs is no longer perfectly aligned with the distribution of firm-level productivity across firms. This model not only explains why, at the macro and micro level, disagreement shocks are different from uncertainty shocks, as documented in Chapter 1, but helps reconcile a key challenge faced by the standard framework to study economic uncertainty: a trade-off between sizable business cycle effects due to changes in uncertainty, and the right amount of pro-cyclicality of firm-level investment rate dispersion, as measured by its correlation with the output cycles.