CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS AND COMBATANTS’ BEHAVIORS: STRATEGY, PERCEPTION, AND REPUTATION

Three projects in my dissertation focus on the termination of internal conflicts based on three critical factors: a combatant’s bargaining strategy, perceptions of relative capabilities, and reputation for toughness. My dissertation aims to provide the relevant theoretical framework to understand war termination beyond the simple two-party bargaining context. The first project focuses on the government’s strategic use of peace agreements. The first project suggests that peace can also be designed strategically to create a better bargain in the near future by changing the current power balance, and thus the timing and nature of peace is not solely a function of overcoming current barriers to successful bargaining. As long as the government has no overwhelming capability to defeat all rebel groups simultaneously, it needs to keep multiple rebel groups as divided as possible. This strategic partial peace helps to deter multiple rebel groups from collaborating in the battlefield and increases the chances of victory against non-signatories. The second project deals with combatants’ perceptions of relative capabilities. While bargaining theories of war suggest that war ends when combatants share a similar perception about their relative capabilities, combatants’ perceptions about relative capabilities are not often homogeneous. While focusing on information problems, this paper examines when a rebel group underestimates the government’s supremacy in relative capabilities and how this heterogeneous perception about the power gap influences negotiated settlements. The third project deals with the tension between different types of reputations in the context of civil wars: 1) a reputation for resolve and 2) a reputation for keeping human rights standards. In the context of civil wars, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government is costly, and as such, it signals the government’s toughness (or resolve) to rebel groups. I argue that the rebels are more likely to accept the government’s offer when the government recently engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the conflict. This effect, however, is conditional on the government’s international human rights reputation; suggesting that rebel groups interpret this violence as a signal particularly when the government does not have a penchant for attacking civilians in general.

Using Quantitative Methods to Explore Political Leverage, Trade Policy, and Food Security: A Case Study of the Middle East

This dissertation explores why some states consistently secure food imports at prices higher than the world market price, thereby exacerbating food insecurity domestically. I challenge the idea that free market economics alone can explain these trade behaviors, and instead argue that states take into account political considerations when engaging in food trade that results in inefficient trade. In particular, states that are dependent on imports of staple food products, like cereals, are wary of the potential strategic value of these goods to exporters. I argue that this consideration, combined with the importing state’s ability to mitigate that risk through its own forms of political or economic leverage, will shape the behavior of the importing state and contribute to its potential for food security. In addition to cross-national analyses, I use case studies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan to demonstrate how the political tools available to these importers affect their food security. The results of my analyses suggest that when import dependent states have access to forms of political leverage, they are more likely to trade efficiently, thereby increasing their potential for food security.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS IN NONPROFIT UNIVERSITY: A PROJECT GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

The universities rely on the Information Technology (IT) projects to support and enhance their core strategic objectives of teaching, research, and administration. The researcher’s literature review found that the level of IT funding and resources in the universities is not adequate to meet the IT demands. The universities received more IT project requests than they could execute. As such, universities must selectively fund the IT projects. The objectives of the IT projects in the universities vary. An IT project which benefits the teaching functions may not benefit the administrative functions. As such, the selection of an IT project is challenging in the universities. To aid with the IT decision making, many universities in the United States of America (USA) have formed the IT Governance (ITG) processes. ITG is an IT decision making and accountability framework whose purpose is to align the IT efforts in an organization with its strategic objectives, realize the value of the IT investments, meet the expected performance criteria, and manage the risks and the resources (Weil & Ross, 2004). ITG in the universities is relatively new, and it is not well known how the ITG processes are aiding the nonprofit universities in selecting the right IT projects, and managing the performance of these IT projects. This research adds to the body of knowledge regarding the IT project selection under the governance structure, the maturity of the IT projects, and the IT project performance in the nonprofit universities. The case study research methodology was chosen for this exploratory research. The convenience sampling was done to choose the cases from two large, research universities with decentralized colleges, and two small, centralized universities. The data were collected on nine IT projects from these four universities using the interviews and the university documents. The multi-case analysis was complemented by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to systematically analyze how the IT conditions lead to an outcome. This research found that the IT projects were selected in the centralized universities in a more informed manner. ITG was more authoritative in the small centralized universities; the ITG committees were formed by including the key decision makers, the decision-making roles, and responsibilities were better defined, and the frequency of ITG communication was higher. In the centralized universities, the business units and colleges brought the IT requests to ITG committees; which in turn prioritized the IT requests and allocated the funds and the resources to the IT projects. ITG committee members in the centralized universities had a higher awareness of the university-wide IT needs, and the IT projects tended to align with the strategic objectives. On the other hand, the decentralized colleges and business units in the large universities were influential and often bypassed the ITG processes. The decentralized units often chose the “pet” IT projects, and executed them within a silo, without bringing them to the attention of the ITG committees. While these IT projects met the departmental objectives, they did not always align with the university’s strategic objectives. This research found that the IT project maturity in the university could be increased by following the project management methodologies. The IT project management maturity was found higher in the IT projects executed by the centralized university, where a full-time project manager was assigned to manage the project, and the project manager had a higher expertise in the project management. The IT project executed under the guidance of the Project Management Office (PMO) has exhibited a higher project management maturity, as the PMO set the standards and controls for the project. The IT projects managed by the decentralized colleges by a part-time project manager with lower project management expertise have exhibited a lower project management maturity. The IT projects in the decentralized colleges were often managed by the business, or technical leads, who often lacked the project management expertise. This research found that higher the IT project management maturity, the better is the project performance. The IT projects with a higher maturity had a lower project delay, lower number of missed requirements, and lower number of IT system errors. This research found that the quality of IT decision in the university could be improved by centralizing the IT decision-making processes. The IT project management maturity could be improved by following the project management methodologies. The stakeholder management and communication were found critical for the success of the IT projects in the university. It is hoped that the findings from this research would help the university leaders make the strategic IT decisions, and the university’s IT project managers make the IT project decisions.