Who Governs Educational Change? The Paradoxes of State Power and the Pursuit of Educational Reform in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador (2007-2015)

This study identifies and compares competing policy stories of key actors involved in the Ecuadorian education reform under President Rafael Correa from 2007-2015. By revealing these competing policy stories the study generates insights into the political and technical aspects of education reform in a context where state capacity has been eroded by decades of neoliberal policies. Since the elections in 2007, President Correa has focused much of his political effort and capital on reconstituting the state’s authority and capacity to not only formulate but also implement public policies. The concentration of power combined with a capacity building agenda allowed the Correa government to advance an ambitious comprehensive education reform with substantive results in equity and quality. At the same time the concentration of power has undermined a more inclusive and participatory approach which are essential for deepening and sustaining the reform. This study underscores both the limits and importance of state control over education; the inevitable conflicts and complexities associated with education reforms that focus on quality; and the limits and importance of participation in reform. Finally, it examines the analytical benefits of understanding governance, participation and quality as socially constructed concepts that are tied to normative and ideological interests.

Foreign Direct Investment and Political Uncertainty

Recent developments in the general equilibrium theory of multinationals emphasize the importance of multilateral considerations. Yet, existing explanations and corresponding estimations of FDI patterns have largely limited political and institutional investment impediments to a bilateral framework. Through the application of spatial econometric techniques, I demonstrate that the presence of both domestic and regional political uncertainty generate real options effects that lead to the delay or redirection of foreign direct investment. The magnitude and direction of these effects is conditional upon the host country regime type and the predominant multinational integration strategies in the region. Comparing these results with FDI of U.S. origin, I find evidence for divergent investment behavior by U.S. multinationals during regime changes in partner countries. Additionally, I find no evidence that multinationals from developing countries are more likely to complete cross-border deals in environments characterized by greater political risk or political uncertainty.