Reconciling History and International Law: Territorial and Maritime Claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea

High-ranking Chinese military officials are often quoted in international media as stating that China cannot afford to lose even an inch of Chinese territory, as this territory has been passed down from Chinese ancestors. Such statements are not new in Chinese politics, but recently this narrative has made an important transition. While previously limited to disputes over land borders, such rhetoric is now routinely applied to disputes involving islands and maritime borders. China is increasingly oriented toward its maritime borders and seems unwilling to compromise on delimitation disputes, a transition mirrored by many states across the globe. In a similar vein, scholarship has found that territorial disputes are particularly intractable and volatile when compared with other types of disputes, and a large body of research has grappled with producing systematic knowledge of territorial conflict. Yet in this wide body of literature, an important question has remained largely unanswered - how do states determine which geographical areas will be included in their territorial and maritime claims? In other words, if nations are willing to fight and die for an inch of national territory, how do governments draw the boundaries of the nation? This dissertation uses in-depth case studies of some of the most prominent territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia to argue that domestic political processes play a dominant and previously under-explored role in both shaping claims and determining the nature of territorial and maritime disputes. China and Taiwan are particularly well suited for this type of investigation, as they are separate claimants in multiple disputes, yet they both draw upon the same historical record when establishing and justifying their claims. Leveraging fieldwork in Taiwan, China, and the US, this dissertation includes in-depth case studies of China’s and Taiwan’s respective claims in both the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Evidence from this dissertation indicates that officials in both China and Taiwan have struggled with how to reconcile history and international law when establishing their claims, and that this struggle has introduced ambiguity into China's and Taiwan's claims. Amid this process, domestic political dynamics have played a dominant role in shaping the options available and the potential for claims to change in the future. In Taiwan’s democratic system, where national identity is highly contested through party politics, opinions vary along a broad spectrum as to the proper borders of the nation, and there is considerable evidence that Taiwan’s claims may change in the near future. In contrast, within China’s single-party authoritarian political system, where nationalism is source of regime legitimacy, views on the proper interpretation of China’s boundaries do vary, but along a much more narrow range. In the dissertation’s final chapter, additional cases, such as South Korea’s position on Dokdo and Indonesia’s approach to the defense of Natuna are used as points of comparison to further clarify theoretical findings.

Crises and Crisis Generations: International Conflict and Military Participation in Politics

Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in politics and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. International crises underscore the need for the military to defend the state and highlight military deficiencies in this regard. Accordingly, major international crises lead to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years, and decades, later due to generational shifts in the officer corps. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and de-politicization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory. Major international crises lead to two waves of military withdrawal from government, years apart. Further statistical analysis finds that this effect is most strongly felt in the non-security areas of governing, while in some cases, international crises may lead to militaries increasing their involvement in security policy-making. Further, international crises that end poorly for a state — i.e., defeats or stalemates — are found to drive more rapid waves of military withdrawal from government. The statistical analysis is supported by a case illustration of civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China, which demonstrates that the crisis of the Korean War (1950-53) led to two waves of military professionalization and de-politicization, decades apart. The first occurred immediately after the war. The second wave, occurring in the 1980s, involved wholesale military withdrawal from governing bodies, which was made possible by the ascent of the "Crisis Generation" of officers in the military, who had served as junior officers in the Korean War, decades prior.

CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS AND COMBATANTS’ BEHAVIORS: STRATEGY, PERCEPTION, AND REPUTATION

Three projects in my dissertation focus on the termination of internal conflicts based on three critical factors: a combatant’s bargaining strategy, perceptions of relative capabilities, and reputation for toughness. My dissertation aims to provide the relevant theoretical framework to understand war termination beyond the simple two-party bargaining context. The first project focuses on the government’s strategic use of peace agreements. The first project suggests that peace can also be designed strategically to create a better bargain in the near future by changing the current power balance, and thus the timing and nature of peace is not solely a function of overcoming current barriers to successful bargaining. As long as the government has no overwhelming capability to defeat all rebel groups simultaneously, it needs to keep multiple rebel groups as divided as possible. This strategic partial peace helps to deter multiple rebel groups from collaborating in the battlefield and increases the chances of victory against non-signatories. The second project deals with combatants’ perceptions of relative capabilities. While bargaining theories of war suggest that war ends when combatants share a similar perception about their relative capabilities, combatants’ perceptions about relative capabilities are not often homogeneous. While focusing on information problems, this paper examines when a rebel group underestimates the government’s supremacy in relative capabilities and how this heterogeneous perception about the power gap influences negotiated settlements. The third project deals with the tension between different types of reputations in the context of civil wars: 1) a reputation for resolve and 2) a reputation for keeping human rights standards. In the context of civil wars, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government is costly, and as such, it signals the government’s toughness (or resolve) to rebel groups. I argue that the rebels are more likely to accept the government’s offer when the government recently engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the conflict. This effect, however, is conditional on the government’s international human rights reputation; suggesting that rebel groups interpret this violence as a signal particularly when the government does not have a penchant for attacking civilians in general.

Using Quantitative Methods to Explore Political Leverage, Trade Policy, and Food Security: A Case Study of the Middle East

This dissertation explores why some states consistently secure food imports at prices higher than the world market price, thereby exacerbating food insecurity domestically. I challenge the idea that free market economics alone can explain these trade behaviors, and instead argue that states take into account political considerations when engaging in food trade that results in inefficient trade. In particular, states that are dependent on imports of staple food products, like cereals, are wary of the potential strategic value of these goods to exporters. I argue that this consideration, combined with the importing state’s ability to mitigate that risk through its own forms of political or economic leverage, will shape the behavior of the importing state and contribute to its potential for food security. In addition to cross-national analyses, I use case studies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan to demonstrate how the political tools available to these importers affect their food security. The results of my analyses suggest that when import dependent states have access to forms of political leverage, they are more likely to trade efficiently, thereby increasing their potential for food security.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

Turkish Security Policymaking on Nuclear Issues: Conceptualizing Advanced Cooperative Security Strategies

Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. As the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member that has a border with the Middle East, Turkish officials argue that Turkey cannot solely rely on NATO guarantees in addressing the regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been able to formulate a security policy that reconciles its quest for independence, its NATO membership, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional engagement in the Middle East. This dissertation assesses the strategic implications of Turkey’s perceptions of the U.S./NATO nuclear and conventional deterrence on nuclear issues. It explores three case studies by the process tracing of Turkish policymakers’ nuclear-related decisions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, national air and missile defense, and Iran’s nuclear program. The study finds that the principles of Turkish security policymaking do not incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have a defining role in Turkish security and defense strategy. The decisions are mainly guided by non-nuclear considerations such as Alliance politics, modernization of the domestic defense industry, and regional influence. The dissertation argues that Turkey could formulate more effective and less risky security policies on nuclear issues by emphasizing the cooperative security approaches within the NATO Alliance over confrontational measures. The findings of this dissertation reveal that a major transformation of Turkish security policymaking is required to end the crisis of confidence with NATO, redefinition of the strategic partnership with the US, and a more cautious approach toward the Middle East. The dissertation argues that Turkey should promote proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats, as well as contribute to developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty.