Ritualizing Barong and Rangda: Repercussions of a Collaborative Field Experience in Kerambitan, Bali.

The dance-drama called Barong and Rangda a ritual, is one of the vital events that breathes life in the small village, Banjar Tista, and extends beyond the boundaries of its "performance" area. In this thesis, I depend on Ronald Grimes' concept of "ritualizing" as a continuum in the context of my fieldwork in Bali, Indonesia. The ritual cycle and the collaborative fieldwork process are analyzed through the impressions of each fieldworker. Barong and Rangda is a well-documented dance-drama and part of the longer Calonarang story. This dance-drama is a mythological battle between the lion, Barong, and the witch, Rangda, and is performed authentically to create spiritual balance and cleanse its community members of evil. This ritual performance reaches beyond the time and place in which the performance originates and creates a ripple affect on the village members, those in trance, musicians and cultural outsiders alike.

NONDISCLOSURE – A GOOD NEWS SIGNAL?

I examine the implications of nondisclosure in a setting where there is a credible signal as to the proprietary nature of the undisclosed information. Specifically, I investigate the market and analysts' response to firms’ application to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a confidential treatment order (CTO), which allows firms to redact required disclosures from SEC filings when the redacted information is proprietary. I find that the market and analysts react favorably to the voluntary nondisclosure of proprietary information using the SEC confidential treatment process. Market and analysts reactions are more favorable to the redaction of information that is more likely to have proprietary value, such as information related to research and development. In addition, I show that the redacting firms experience superior accounting performance compared to their peers in the years following the redaction, consistent with the market and analysts’ response to the redaction. However, I find that analysts engage in more intense private information search in response to a CTO redaction. This finding suggests that, although a CTO redaction can signal the nature of undisclosed information, analysts believe that the signal is not fully revealing of the economic magnitude of the undisclosed information. Overall, this study’s findings indicate that a firm's willingness to submit to the CTO approval process serves as a credible signal of the proprietary nature of the withheld information. The results of this study suggest a possible role for a credible signaling channel to facilitate communication between insiders and outsiders regarding the nature of withheld information.