Using Quantitative Methods to Explore Political Leverage, Trade Policy, and Food Security: A Case Study of the Middle East

This dissertation explores why some states consistently secure food imports at prices higher than the world market price, thereby exacerbating food insecurity domestically. I challenge the idea that free market economics alone can explain these trade behaviors, and instead argue that states take into account political considerations when engaging in food trade that results in inefficient trade. In particular, states that are dependent on imports of staple food products, like cereals, are wary of the potential strategic value of these goods to exporters. I argue that this consideration, combined with the importing state’s ability to mitigate that risk through its own forms of political or economic leverage, will shape the behavior of the importing state and contribute to its potential for food security. In addition to cross-national analyses, I use case studies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan to demonstrate how the political tools available to these importers affect their food security. The results of my analyses suggest that when import dependent states have access to forms of political leverage, they are more likely to trade efficiently, thereby increasing their potential for food security.

Turkish Security Policymaking on Nuclear Issues: Conceptualizing Advanced Cooperative Security Strategies

Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. As the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member that has a border with the Middle East, Turkish officials argue that Turkey cannot solely rely on NATO guarantees in addressing the regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been able to formulate a security policy that reconciles its quest for independence, its NATO membership, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional engagement in the Middle East. This dissertation assesses the strategic implications of Turkey’s perceptions of the U.S./NATO nuclear and conventional deterrence on nuclear issues. It explores three case studies by the process tracing of Turkish policymakers’ nuclear-related decisions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, national air and missile defense, and Iran’s nuclear program. The study finds that the principles of Turkish security policymaking do not incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have a defining role in Turkish security and defense strategy. The decisions are mainly guided by non-nuclear considerations such as Alliance politics, modernization of the domestic defense industry, and regional influence. The dissertation argues that Turkey could formulate more effective and less risky security policies on nuclear issues by emphasizing the cooperative security approaches within the NATO Alliance over confrontational measures. The findings of this dissertation reveal that a major transformation of Turkish security policymaking is required to end the crisis of confidence with NATO, redefinition of the strategic partnership with the US, and a more cautious approach toward the Middle East. The dissertation argues that Turkey should promote proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats, as well as contribute to developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty.