Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.

EXISTENCE OF UNUSED MANAGED CAPACITY ON DEDICATED LANES AND AN ALTERNATIVE ON HOW TO SELL IT VIA AUCTIONS

This dissertation verifies whether the following two hypotheses are true: (1) High-occupancy/toll lanes (and therefore other dedicated lanes) have capacity that could still be used; (2) such unused capacity (or more precisely, “unused managed capacity”) can be sold successfully through a real-time auction. To show that the second statement is true, this dissertation proposes an auction-based metering (ABM) system, that is, a mechanism that regulates traffic that enters the dedicated lanes. Participation in the auction is voluntary and can be skipped by paying the toll or by not registering to the new system. This dissertation comprises the following four components: a measurement of unused managed capacity on an existing HOT facility, a game-theoretic model of an ABM system, an operational description of the ABM system, and a simulation-based evaluation of the system. Some other and more specific contributions of this dissertation include the following: (1) It provides a definition and a methodology for measuring unused managed capacity and another important variable referred as “potential volume increase”. (2) It proves that the game-theoretic model has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (3) And it provides a specific road design that can be applied or extended to other facilities. The results provide evidence that the hypotheses are true and suggest that the ABM system would benefit a public operator interested in reducing traffic congestion significantly, would benefit drivers when making low-reliability trips (such as work-to-home trips), and would potentially benefit a private operator interested in raising revenue.

Topics in equilibrium and nonequilibrium thermodynamics: computing crystalline free energies and engineering Maxwell’s demon.

This dissertation covers two separate topics in statistical physics. The first part of the dissertation focuses on computational methods of obtaining the free energies (or partition functions) of crystalline solids. We describe a method to compute the Helmholtz free energy of a crystalline solid by direct evaluation of the partition function. In the many-dimensional conformation space of all possible arrangements of N particles inside a periodic box, the energy landscape consists of localized islands corresponding to different solid phases. Calculating the partition function for a specific phase involves integrating over the corresponding island. Introducing a natural order parameter that quantifies the net displacement of particles from lattices sites, we write the partition function in terms of a one-dimensional integral along the order parameter, and evaluate this integral using umbrella sampling. We validate the method by computing free energies of both face-centered cubic (FCC) and hexagonal close-packed (HCP) hard sphere crystals with a precision of $10^{-5}k_BT$ per particle. In developing the numerical method, we find several scaling properties of crystalline solids in the thermodynamic limit. Using these scaling properties, we derive an explicit asymptotic formula for the free energy per particle in the thermodynamic limit. In addition, we describe several changes of coordinates that can be used to separate internal degrees of freedom from external, translational degrees of freedom. The second part of the dissertation focuses on engineering idealized physical devices that work as Maxwell's demon. We describe two autonomous mechanical devices that extract energy from a single heat bath and convert it into work, while writing information onto memory registers. Additionally, both devices can operate as Landauer's eraser, namely they can erase information from a memory register, while energy is dissipated into the heat bath. The phase diagrams and the efficiencies of the two models are solved and analyzed. These two models provide concrete physical illustrations of the thermodynamic consequences of information processing.