3 resultados para Moral hazard
em DRUM (Digital Repository at the University of Maryland)
Resumo:
This dissertation examines how social insurance, family support and work capacity enhance individuals' economic well-being following significant health and income shocks. I first examine the extent to which the liquidity-enhancing effects of Worker's Compensation (WC) benefits outweigh the moral hazard costs. Analyzing administrative data from Oregon, I estimate a hazard model exploiting variation in the timing and size of a retroactive lump-sum WC payment to decompose the elasticity of claim duration with respect to benefits into the elasticity with respect to an increase in cash on hand, and a decrease in the opportunity cost of missing work. I find that the liquidity effect accounts for 60 to 65 percent of the increase in claim duration among lower-wage workers, but less than half of the increase for higher earners. Using the framework from Chetty (2008), I conclude that the insurance value of WC exceeds the distortionary cost, and increasing the benefit level could increase social welfare. Next, I investigate how government-provided disability insurance (DI) interacts with private transfers to disabled individuals from their grown children. Using the Health and Retirement Study, I estimate a fixed effects, difference in differences regression to compare transfers between DI recipients and two control groups: rejected applicants and a reweighted sample of disabled non-applicants. I find that DI reduces the probability of receiving a transfer by no more than 3 percentage points, or 10 percent. Additional analysis reveals that DI could increase the probability of receiving a transfer in cases where children had limited prior information about the disability, suggesting that DI could send a welfare-improving information signal. Finally, Zachary Morris and I examine how a functional assessment could complement medical evaluations in determining eligibility for disability benefits and in targeting return to work interventions. We analyze claimants' self-reported functional capacity in a survey of current DI beneficiaries to estimate the share of disability claimants able to do work-related activity. We estimate that 13 percent of current DI beneficiaries are capable of work-related activity. Furthermore, other characteristics of these higher-functioning beneficiaries are positively correlated with employment, making them an appropriate target for return to work interventions.
Resumo:
This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.
Resumo:
Prior research shows that electronic word of mouth (eWOM) wields considerable influence over consumer behavior. However, as the volume and variety of eWOM grows, firms are faced with challenges in analyzing and responding to this information. In this dissertation, I argue that to meet the new challenges and opportunities posed by the expansion of eWOM and to more accurately measure its impacts on firms and consumers, we need to revisit our methodologies for extracting insights from eWOM. This dissertation consists of three essays that further our understanding of the value of social media analytics, especially with respect to eWOM. In the first essay, I use machine learning techniques to extract semantic structure from online reviews. These semantic dimensions describe the experiences of consumers in the service industry more accurately than traditional numerical variables. To demonstrate the value of these dimensions, I show that they can be used to substantially improve the accuracy of econometric models of firm survival. In the second essay, I explore the effects on eWOM of online deals, such as those offered by Groupon, the value of which to both consumers and merchants is controversial. Through a combination of Bayesian econometric models and controlled lab experiments, I examine the conditions under which online deals affect online reviews and provide strategies to mitigate the potential negative eWOM effects resulting from online deals. In the third essay, I focus on how eWOM can be incorporated into efforts to reduce foodborne illness, a major public health concern. I demonstrate how machine learning techniques can be used to monitor hygiene in restaurants through crowd-sourced online reviews. I am able to identify instances of moral hazard within the hygiene inspection scheme used in New York City by leveraging a dictionary specifically crafted for this purpose. To the extent that online reviews provide some visibility into the hygiene practices of restaurants, I show how losses from information asymmetry may be partially mitigated in this context. Taken together, this dissertation contributes by revisiting and refining the use of eWOM in the service sector through a combination of machine learning and econometric methodologies.