Assessing the viability of studying motion indicators of autism spectrum disorders in infants at high and low risk for ASD using a passive motion capture system

Gemstone Team AMIRA

An Exploration of Auditory Brainstem Encoding of Stop Consonants in Infants and Implications for Language Outcomes

Current trends in speech-language pathology focus on early intervention as the preferred tool for promoting the best possible outcomes in children with language disorders. Neuroimaging techniques are being studied as promising tools for flagging at-risk infants. In this study, the auditory brainstem response (ABR) to the syllables /ba/ and /ga/ was examined in 41 infants between 3 and 12 months of age as a possible tool to predict language development in toddlerhood. The MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) was used to assess language development at 18 months of age. The current study compared the periodicity of the responses to the stop consonants and phase differences between /ba/ and /ga/ in both at-risk and low-risk groups. The study also examined whether there are correlations among ABR measures (periodicity and phase differentiation) and language development. The study found that these measures predict language development at 18 months.

Essays on Market Frictions and Securitization

This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.