Foreign Direct Investment and Political Uncertainty

Recent developments in the general equilibrium theory of multinationals emphasize the importance of multilateral considerations. Yet, existing explanations and corresponding estimations of FDI patterns have largely limited political and institutional investment impediments to a bilateral framework. Through the application of spatial econometric techniques, I demonstrate that the presence of both domestic and regional political uncertainty generate real options effects that lead to the delay or redirection of foreign direct investment. The magnitude and direction of these effects is conditional upon the host country regime type and the predominant multinational integration strategies in the region. Comparing these results with FDI of U.S. origin, I find evidence for divergent investment behavior by U.S. multinationals during regime changes in partner countries. Additionally, I find no evidence that multinationals from developing countries are more likely to complete cross-border deals in environments characterized by greater political risk or political uncertainty.

The Demobilized Body: Transgressions of Personal Space and Political Participation

Grounded in the intersection between gender politics and electoral studies, this dissertation examines the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space (in the form of domestic violence, control over mobility, emotional abuse, and sexual harassment) on the propensity to vote. Using quantitative methods across four survey datasets concerning Lebanon, the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, this research concludes that cross-regionally, familial control over mobility reduces the propensity to vote among women. Conversely, mechanisms of empowerment such as education and employment increase the propensity to vote.

THE MUSIC PERFORMED FOR THE SACRIFICIAL RITE AT THE ROYAL ANCESTRAL SHRINE OF THE CHOSŎN DYNASTY (1392–1910): INDIVIDUAL AGENCY AND DISCOURSE ON MUSIC EXPRESSED IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY KOREAN ENCYCLOPEDIA _TONGGUK MUNHŎN PIGO_ (1770)

In 1964, the South Korean government designated the music for the sacrificial rite at the Royal Ancestral Shrine (Chongmyo) as Intangible Cultural Property No. 1, and in 2001 UNESCO awarded the rite and music a place in the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. The Royal Ancestral Shine sacrificial rite and music together have long been an admired symbol of Korean cultural history, and they are currently performed annually and publicly in an abridged form. While the significance of the modern version of the music mainly rests on the claimed authenticity and continuity of the tradition since the fifteenth century, scholarly inquiry sheds further light on contextual issues such as nationalism, identity, and modernity in the post-colonial era (after 1945), as well as providing additional insights into the music. This dissertation focuses on the Royal Ancestral Shrine’s musical past as reflected in documentary sources, especially those compiled in the eighteenth century during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910). In particular, the substantial music section of an encyclopedic work, Tongguk Munhŏn pigo (Encyclopedia of Documents and Institutions of the East Kingdom, 1770), mainly compiled by a government official, Sŏ Myŏngŭng (1716–1787), provides a considerable amount of information on not only the music and sacrificial rite program, but also on eighteenth-century and earlier concerns about them, as discussed by the kings and ministers at the Chosŏn royal court. After detailed examination of various relevant documentary sources on the historical, social and political contexts, I investigate the various discourses on music and ritual practices. I then focus on Sŏ Myŏngŭng’s familial background, his writings on music prior to the compilation of the encyclopedia, and the corresponding content in the encyclopedia. I argue that Sŏ successfully converted the music section of the encyclopedia from a straightforward scholarly reference work to a space for publishing his own research on and interpretation of the musical past, illustrating what he considered to be the inappropriateness of the existing music for the sacrificial rite at the Royal Ancestral Shrine in the later eighteenth century.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).