UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BROWN MARMORATED STINK BUG, HALYOMORPHA HALYS (STÅL), AND ITS SYMBIONT, PANTOEA CARBEKII, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR STINK BUG MANAGEMENT

Symbiotic relationships between insects and beneficial microbes are very common in nature, especially within the Hemiptera. The brown marmorated stink bug, Halyomorpha halys Stål, harbors a symbiont, Pantoea carbekii, within the fourth region of the midgut in specialized crypts. In this dissertation, I explored this insect- microbe relationship. I determined that the brown marmorated stink bug is heavily reliant on its symbiont, and that experimental removal of the symbiont from the egg mass surface prior to nymphal acquisition led to lower survival, longer development, lower fecundity, and aberrant nymphal behavior. Additionally, I determined that even when the symbiont is acquired and housed in the midgut crypts, it is susceptible to stressors. Stink bugs reared at a higher temperature showed lower survival, longer development, and a cease in egg mass production, and when bugs were screened for their symbiont, fewer had successfully retained it while under heat stress. Finally, with the knowledge that the stink bug suffers decreases in fitness when its symbiont is missing or stressed, I wanted to determine if targeting the symbiont was a possible management technique for the stink bug. I tested the efficacy of a number of different insecticidal and antimicrobial products to determine whether prevention of symbiont acquisition from the egg mass was possible, and results indicated that transmission of the symbiont from the egg mass to the newly hatched nymph was negatively impacted when certain products were applied (namely surfactants or products containing surfactants). Additionally, direct effects on hatch rate and survival were reported for certain products, namely the insect growth regulator azadirachtin, which suggests that nymphs can pick up residues from the egg mass surface while probing for the symbiont. I conclude that P. carbekii plays a critically important role in the survival of its host, the brown marmorated stink bug, and its presence on the egg mass surface before nymphal hatch makes it targetable as a potential management technique.

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.