NONDISCLOSURE – A GOOD NEWS SIGNAL?

I examine the implications of nondisclosure in a setting where there is a credible signal as to the proprietary nature of the undisclosed information. Specifically, I investigate the market and analysts' response to firms’ application to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a confidential treatment order (CTO), which allows firms to redact required disclosures from SEC filings when the redacted information is proprietary. I find that the market and analysts react favorably to the voluntary nondisclosure of proprietary information using the SEC confidential treatment process. Market and analysts reactions are more favorable to the redaction of information that is more likely to have proprietary value, such as information related to research and development. In addition, I show that the redacting firms experience superior accounting performance compared to their peers in the years following the redaction, consistent with the market and analysts’ response to the redaction. However, I find that analysts engage in more intense private information search in response to a CTO redaction. This finding suggests that, although a CTO redaction can signal the nature of undisclosed information, analysts believe that the signal is not fully revealing of the economic magnitude of the undisclosed information. Overall, this study’s findings indicate that a firm's willingness to submit to the CTO approval process serves as a credible signal of the proprietary nature of the withheld information. The results of this study suggest a possible role for a credible signaling channel to facilitate communication between insiders and outsiders regarding the nature of withheld information.

The role of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in information and communication in science. A conceptual framework and empirical study

Problem This dissertation presents a literature-based framework for communication in science (with the elements partners, purposes, message, and channel), which it then applies in and amends through an empirical study of how geoscientists use two social computing technologies (SCTs), blogging and Twitter (both general use and tweeting from conferences). How are these technologies used and what value do scientists derive from them? Method The empirical part used a two-pronged qualitative study, using (1) purposive samples of ~400 blog posts and ~1000 tweets and (2) a purposive sample of 8 geoscientist interviews. Blog posts, tweets, and interviews were coded using the framework, adding new codes as needed. The results were aggregated into 8 geoscientist case studies, and general patterns were derived through cross-case analysis. Results A detailed picture of how geoscientists use blogs and twitter emerged, including a number of new functions not served by traditional channels. Some highlights: Geoscientists use SCTs for communication among themselves as well as with the public. Blogs serve persuasion and personal knowledge management; Twitter often amplifies the signal of traditional communications such as journal articles. Blogs include tutorials for peers, reviews of basic science concepts, and book reviews. Twitter includes links to readings, requests for assistance, and discussions of politics and religion. Twitter at conferences provides live coverage of sessions. Conclusions Both blogs and Twitter are routine parts of scientists' communication toolbox, blogs for in-depth, well-prepared essays, Twitter for faster and broader interactions. Both have important roles in supporting community building, mentoring, and learning and teaching. The Framework of Communication in Science was a useful tool in studying these two SCTs in this domain. The results should encourage science administrators to facilitate SCT use of scientists in their organization and information providers to search SCT documents as an important source of information.

Essays on Information Frictions, Prices and Unemployment

I investigate the effects of information frictions in price setting decisions. I show that firms' output prices and wages are less sensitive to aggregate economic conditions when firms and workers cannot perfectly understand (or know) the aggregate state of the economy. Prices and wages respond with a lag to aggregate innovations because agents learn slowly about those changes, and this delayed adjustment in prices makes output and unemployment more sensitive to aggregate shocks. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I show that workers' noisy information about the state of the economy help us to explain why real wages are sluggish. In the context of a search and matching model, wages do not immediately respond to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. This increases firms' incentives to post more vacancies, and it makes unemployment volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. This mechanism is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment: the flexibility of wages for new hires and the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment. Calibrated to U.S. data, the model explains 60% of the overall unemployment volatility. Consistent with empirical evidence, the response of unemployment to TFP shocks predicted by my model is large, hump-shaped, and peaks one year after the TFP shock, while the response of the aggregate wage is weak and delayed, peaking after two years. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I study the role of information frictions and inventories in firms' price setting decisions in the context of a monetary model. In this model, intermediate goods firms accumulate output inventories, observe aggregate variables with one period lag, and observe their nominal input prices and demand at all times. Firms face idiosyncratic shocks and cannot perfectly infer the state of nature. After a contractionary nominal shock, nominal input prices go down, and firms accumulate inventories because they perceive some positive probability that the nominal price decline is due to a good productivity shock. This prevents firms' prices from decreasing and makes current profits, households' income, and aggregate demand go down. According to my model simulations, a 1% decrease in the money growth rate causes output to decline 0.17% in the first quarter and 0.38% in the second followed by a slow recovery to the steady state. Contractionary nominal shocks also have significant effects on total investment, which remains 1% below the steady state for the first 6 quarters.