PIANO AS A PARTNER IN TWENTIETH­ CENTURY ART SONG REPERTOIRE: A RECORDING PROJECT

The piano's role in art song repertoire has evolved from a modest one during its formative years to the versatility, complexity and creativity found in the twentieth-century. The art song repertoire of the twentieth century is vast and has secured the reputation for being the most diverse, innovative, illustrative, atmospheric and colorful in all of art song literature. Within this time period, there are compositions that reach back to the romantic works of nineteenth century, others which combine old and new traditions, and finally those which adopt new means and new ends. In choosing the material for this project, I have focused on compositions with uniquely challenging and unusual piano accompaniments in order to achieve a balance between well- known and rarely performed works, as well as those pieces that combine various languages and styles. Selections range from Claude Debussy, Richard Strauss, Sergey Rachmaninoff, Ralph Vaughan Williams, Roger Quilter, Francis Poulenc, Fernando Obradors, and Joaquin Rodrigo to composers such as Samuel Barber, Marc Blitzstein, Dominick Argento, William Bolcom, and John Duke, including arrangements of traditional spirituals by Harry T. Burleigh and Florence B. Price, all of which helped to establish the American Art Song. My objective is to trace the development of the twentieth-century art song from the late Romantic Period through nationalistitrends to works which show the influences of jazz and folk elements. The two CD's for this dissertation recording project are available on compact discs which can be found in the Digital Repository at the University of Maryland (DRUM). The performers were Daniel Armstrong, baritone, Giles Herman, baritone, Thomas Glenn, tenor, Valerie Yinzant, soprano, Aaron Odom, tenor, Jennifer Royal, soprano, Kenneth Harmon, tenor, Karen Sorenson, soprano and Maxim Ivanov, baritone.

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.