A Social Cognitive Approach to Coping with Acculturative Stress in International Students

The present study employed a cross-sectional design to test a model of coping with acculturative stress in an international student sample. Drawing from Lent’s (2004) social cognitive model of restorative well-being, several direct and mediated paths were hypothesized to predict (negatively) acculturative stress and (positively) life satisfaction. Behavioral acculturation and behavioral enculturation (Kim & Omizo, 2006) were also examined as predictors of coping with acculturative stress among international students. Using a self-report survey, participants’ ratings of acculturative stress, life satisfaction, social support, behavioral acculturation, behavioral enculturation, and coping self-efficacy were assessed. The results revealed that the variables of the model explained 16% of the variance in acculturative stress and 27% of the variance in life satisfaction. A final model, including the use of modification indices, provided good fit to the data. Findings also suggested that coping self-efficacy was a direct predictor of acculturative stress, and that behavioral acculturation and coping self-efficacy were direct predictors of students’ life satisfaction. Limitations, future research, and practical implications are discussed.

Reconciling History and International Law: Territorial and Maritime Claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea

High-ranking Chinese military officials are often quoted in international media as stating that China cannot afford to lose even an inch of Chinese territory, as this territory has been passed down from Chinese ancestors. Such statements are not new in Chinese politics, but recently this narrative has made an important transition. While previously limited to disputes over land borders, such rhetoric is now routinely applied to disputes involving islands and maritime borders. China is increasingly oriented toward its maritime borders and seems unwilling to compromise on delimitation disputes, a transition mirrored by many states across the globe. In a similar vein, scholarship has found that territorial disputes are particularly intractable and volatile when compared with other types of disputes, and a large body of research has grappled with producing systematic knowledge of territorial conflict. Yet in this wide body of literature, an important question has remained largely unanswered - how do states determine which geographical areas will be included in their territorial and maritime claims? In other words, if nations are willing to fight and die for an inch of national territory, how do governments draw the boundaries of the nation? This dissertation uses in-depth case studies of some of the most prominent territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia to argue that domestic political processes play a dominant and previously under-explored role in both shaping claims and determining the nature of territorial and maritime disputes. China and Taiwan are particularly well suited for this type of investigation, as they are separate claimants in multiple disputes, yet they both draw upon the same historical record when establishing and justifying their claims. Leveraging fieldwork in Taiwan, China, and the US, this dissertation includes in-depth case studies of China’s and Taiwan’s respective claims in both the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Evidence from this dissertation indicates that officials in both China and Taiwan have struggled with how to reconcile history and international law when establishing their claims, and that this struggle has introduced ambiguity into China's and Taiwan's claims. Amid this process, domestic political dynamics have played a dominant role in shaping the options available and the potential for claims to change in the future. In Taiwan’s democratic system, where national identity is highly contested through party politics, opinions vary along a broad spectrum as to the proper borders of the nation, and there is considerable evidence that Taiwan’s claims may change in the near future. In contrast, within China’s single-party authoritarian political system, where nationalism is source of regime legitimacy, views on the proper interpretation of China’s boundaries do vary, but along a much more narrow range. In the dissertation’s final chapter, additional cases, such as South Korea’s position on Dokdo and Indonesia’s approach to the defense of Natuna are used as points of comparison to further clarify theoretical findings.

Clouds of Suspicion: Airspace Arrangements, Escalation, and Discord in U.S./NATO-Russian Relations

How have cooperative airspace arrangements contributed to cooperation and discord in the Euro-Atlantic region? This study analyzes the role of three sets of airspace arrangements developed by Euro-Atlantic states since the end of the Cold War—(1) cooperative aerial surveillance of military activity, (2) exchange of air situational data, and (3) joint engagement of theater air and missile threats—in political-military relations among neighbors and within the region. These arrangements provide insights into the integration of Central and Eastern European states into Western security institutions, and the current discord that centers on the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s place in regional security. The study highlights the role of airspace incidents as contributors to conflict escalation and identifies opportunities for transparency- and confidence-building measures to improve U.S./NATO-Russian relations. The study recommends strengthening the Open Skies Treaty in order to facilitate the resolution of conflicts and improve region-wide military transparency. It notes that political-military arrangements for engaging theater air and missile threats created by NATO and Russia over the last twenty years are currently postured in a way that divides the region and inhibits mutual security. In turn, the U.S.-led Regional Airspace Initiatives that facilitated the exchange of air situational data between NATO and then-NATO-aspirants such as Poland and the Baltic states, offer a useful precedent for improving air sovereignty and promoting information sharing to reduce the fear of war among participating states. Thus, projects like NATO’s Air Situational Data Exchange and the NATO-Russia Council Cooperative Airspace Initiative—if extended to the exchange of data about military aircraft—have the potential to buttress deterrence and contribute to conflict prevention. The study concludes that documenting the evolution of airspace arrangements since the end of the Cold War contributes to understanding of the conflicting narratives put forward by Russia, the West, and the states “in-between” with respect to reasons for the current state of regional security. The long-term project of developing a zone of stable peace in the Euro-Atlantic must begin with the difficult task of building inclusive security institutions to accommodate the concerns of all regional actors.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

The Origins and Legacy of a Currency Board in Argentina

This is a qualitative case study of the adoption of a currency board in Argentina in 1991. It presents a discursive analysis and intellectual history of four overlaying and mutually influencing stories of Convertibility’s adoption. It is (1) the story of how Menem aligned himself to the Washington Consensus as a means to win a Presidential election. This ideological alignment influences and is influenced by a (2) reconstitution of the Peronist Party’s historically entrenched identity. This in turn re-fashion the whole system of interest articulation and relative power of interest groups in Argentina. The adoption of a currency board also marks the pace of (3) the entrenchment neoliberal interests across a domestic network of neoliberal think-tanks, technocrats, politicians, and “technopoles” articulating neoliberal interests outside of the Washington Consensus, within an International Neoliberal Network. Argentina’s adoption of a currency board falls in line with the Corner Solutions, a neoliberal doctrine promoted to influence developing countries to adopt two forms of exchange rate regimes that allow for less government involvement, including a currency board. Argentina starts as a test country and then becomes (4) an ideological stepping stone to help promote the creation of currency boards across more “developing” countries. These stories are not sequential but concurrent, and they help advance an alternative critique of neoliberalism that focuses on specifics to induce case-specific lessons versus a theory claiming to provide any universal truth.