Credible Commitments and Post-Conflict Refugee Return: A Statistical and Network Analysis

I examine determinants of refugee return after conflicts. I argue that institutional constraints placed on the executive provide a credible commitment that signals to refugees that the conditions required for durable return will be created. This results in increased return flows for refugees. Further, when credible commitments are stronger in the country of origin than in the country of asylum, the level of return increases. Finally, I find that specific commitments made to refugees in the peace agreement do not lead to increased return because they are not credible without institutional constraints. Using data on returnees that has only recently been made available, along with network analysis and an original coding of the provisions in refugee agreements, statistical results are found to support this theory. An examination of cases in Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Liberia provides additional support for this argument.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

PHYTOPLANKTON AND NUTRIENT DYNAMICS WITH A FOCUS ON NITROGEN FORM IN THE ANACOSTIA RIVER, IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AND WEST LAKE, IN HANGZHOU, CHINA

Nutrient loading has been linked with severe water quality impairment, ranging from hypoxia to increased frequency of harmful algal blooms (HABs), loss of fisheries, and changes in biodiversity. Waters around the globe are experiencing deleterious effects of eutrophication; however, the relative amount of nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) reaching these waters is not changing proportionately, with high N loads increasingly enriched in chemically-reduced N forms. Research involving two urban freshwater and nutrient enriched systems, the Anacostia River, USA, a tributary of the Potomac River feeding into the Chesapeake Bay, and West Lake, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China, was conducted to assess the response of phytoplankton communities to changing N-form and N/P-ratios. Field observations involving the characterization of ambient phytoplankton communities and N-forms, as well as experimental (nutrient enrichment) manipulations were used to understand shifts in phytoplankton community composition with increasing NH4+ loads. In both locations, a >2-fold increase in ambient NH4+:NO3- ratios was followed by a shift in the phytoplankton community, with diatoms giving way to chlorophytes and cyanobacteria. Enrichment experiments mirrored this, in that samples enriched with NH4+ lead to increased abundance of chlorophytes and cyanobacteria. This work shows that in both of these systems experiencing nutrient enrichment that NH4+ supports communities dominated by more chlorophytes and cyanobacteria than other phytoplankton groups.