ASSESSING QUALITY IN HIGH-UNCERTAINTY MARKETS: ONLINE REVIEWS OF CREDENCE SERVICES

In economics of information theory, credence products are those whose quality is difficult or impossible for consumers to assess, even after they have consumed the product (Darby & Karni, 1973). This dissertation is focused on the content, consumer perception, and power of online reviews for credence services. Economics of information theory has long assumed, without empirical confirmation, that consumers will discount the credibility of claims about credence quality attributes. The same theories predict that because credence services are by definition obscure to the consumer, reviews of credence services are incapable of signaling quality. Our research aims to question these assumptions. In the first essay we examine how the content and structure of online reviews of credence services systematically differ from the content and structure of reviews of experience services and how consumers judge these differences. We have found that online reviews of credence services have either less important or less credible content than reviews of experience services and that consumers do discount the credibility of credence claims. However, while consumers rationally discount the credibility of simple credence claims in a review, more complex argument structure and the inclusion of evidence attenuate this effect. In the second essay we ask, “Can online reviews predict the worst doctors?” We examine the power of online reviews to detect low quality, as measured by state medical board sanctions. We find that online reviews are somewhat predictive of a doctor’s suitability to practice medicine; however, not all the data are useful. Numerical or star ratings provide the strongest quality signal; user-submitted text provides some signal but is subsumed almost completely by ratings. Of the ratings variables in our dataset, we find that punctuality, rather than knowledge, is the strongest predictor of medical board sanctions. These results challenge the definition of credence products, which is a long-standing construct in economics of information theory. Our results also have implications for online review users, review platforms, and for the use of predictive modeling in the context of information systems research.

THE PHYSICS OF IDEAS: INFERRING THE MECHANICS OF OPINION FORMATION FROM MACROSCOPIC STATISTICAL PATTERNS

In a microscopic setting, humans behave in rich and unexpected ways. In a macroscopic setting, however, distinctive patterns of group behavior emerge, leading statistical physicists to search for an underlying mechanism. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the macroscopic patterns of competing ideas in order to discern the mechanics of how group opinions form at the microscopic level. First, we explore the competition of answers in online Q&A (question and answer) boards. We find that a simple individual-level model can capture important features of user behavior, especially as the number of answers to a question grows. Our model further suggests that the wisdom of crowds may be constrained by information overload, in which users are unable to thoroughly evaluate each answer and therefore tend to use heuristics to pick what they believe is the best answer. Next, we explore models of opinion spread among voters to explain observed universal statistical patterns such as rescaled vote distributions and logarithmic vote correlations. We introduce a simple model that can explain both properties, as well as why it takes so long for large groups to reach consensus. An important feature of the model that facilitates agreement with data is that individuals become more stubborn (unwilling to change their opinion) over time. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms for opinion formation in juries, by comparing data to various types of models. We find that different null hypotheses in which jurors do not interact when reaching a decision are in strong disagreement with data compared to a simple interaction model. These findings provide conceptual and mechanistic support for previous work that has found mutual influence can play a large role in group decisions. In addition, by matching our models to data, we are able to infer the time scales over which individuals change their opinions for different jury contexts. We find that these values increase as a function of the trial time, suggesting that jurors and judicial panels exhibit a kind of stubbornness similar to what we include in our model of voting behavior.