From Cash to Electronic Payments: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic, and Policy Aspects of Retail Payment Systems

This dissertation explores three aspects of the economics and policy issues surrounding retail payments (low-value frequent payments): the microeconomic aspect, by measuring costs associated with retail payment instruments; the macroeconomic aspect, by quantifying the impact of the use of electronic rather than paper-based payment instruments on consumption and GDP; and the policy aspect, by identifying barriers that keep countries stuck with outdated payment systems, and recommending policy interventions to move forward with payments modernization. Payment system modernization has become a prominent part of the financial sector reform agenda in many advanced and developing countries. Greater use of electronic payments rather than cash and other paper-based instruments would have important economic and social benefits, including lower costs and thereby increased economic efficiency and higher incomes, while broadening access to the financial system, notably for people with moderate and low incomes. The dissertation starts with a general introduction on retail payments. Chapter 1 develops a theoretical model for measuring payments costs, and applies the model to Guyana—an emerging market in the midst of the transition from paper to electronic payments. Using primary survey data from Guyanese consumers, the results of the analysis indicate that annual costs related to the use of cash by consumers reach 2.5 percent of the country’s GDP. Switching to electronic payment instruments would provide savings amounting to 1 percent of GDP per year. Chapter 2 broadens the analysis to calculate the macroeconomic impacts of a move to electronic payments. Using a unique panel dataset of 76 countries across the 17-year span from 1998 to 2014 and a pooled OLS country fixed effects model, Chapter 2 finds that on average, use of debit and credit cards contribute USD 16.2 billion to annual global consumption, and USD 160 billion to overall annual global GDP. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth assessment of the Albanian payment cards and remittances market and recommends a set of incentives and regulations (both carrots and sticks) that would allow the country to modernize its payment system. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the lessons of the dissertation’s research and brings forward issues to be explored by future research in the retail payments area.

Essays on Market Frictions and Securitization

This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk assets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and low risk. Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed. First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic setting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guarantees reduces the dependence of banks' ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.