Essays in Corporate Finance

Prior research has been divided regarding how firms respond to bankruptcy risk, largely revolving around two competing forces. On the one hand, asset substitution encourages firms to increase the riskiness of assets to extract value from creditors. On the other, firms want to minimize bankruptcy risk, either by reducing cash flow risk or through increasing the size of the firm. I test these two theories using a natural experiment of chemicals used in production processes being newly identified as carcinogenic to explore how firms may respond to potential negative cash flow resulting from litigation risk. I use plantlevel chemical data to study firm exposure to risk. I examine how responses between firms of differing levels of chemical exposure may vary within the industry, how firm financial distress affects firm response and whether public and private firms respond differently. In general, my research provides support for the asset substitution theory. My first paper studies how investment response varies based on level of carcinogenic exposure. I find that firms with moderate levels of exposure make efforts to mitigate their cash flow risk and reduce their exposure. At the same time, firms with high levels of exposure increase their exposure and riskiness of future cash flows. These findings are consistent with asset substitution theory. My second paper analyzes the interaction of financial distress and risk exposure. I find that firms in a stronger financial position are more likely to limit their exposure by reducing the number of exposed facilities. On the other hand, not only do firms in weaker financial position not decrease their exposure, I find that, in some instances, they increase their exposure to carcinogens. This work again supports the theory of asset substitution. Finally, in my third paper, I explore if public firms respond differently to a potential negative cash flow shock than do private firms. I test whether existing public firms are more likely to attempt to minimize their cash flow risk and thus reduce their carcinogen exposure than are private firms. I do not find evidence that public firms respond differently to this shock than do private firms.

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.