DESIGN, MODELING, AND FABRICATION OF MICROROBOT LEGS

This dissertation presents work done in the design, modeling, and fabrication of magnetically actuated microrobot legs. Novel fabrication processes for manufacturing multi-material compliant mechanisms have been used to fabricate effective legged robots at both the meso and micro scales, where the meso scale refers to the transition between macro and micro scales. This work discusses the development of a novel mesoscale manufacturing process, Laser Cut Elastomer Refill (LaCER), for prototyping millimeter-scale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges. Additionally discussed is an extension of previous work on the development of a microscale manufacturing process for fabricating micrometer-sale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges, with the added contribution of a method for incorporating magnetic materials for mechanism actuation using externally applied fields. As both of the fabrication processes outlined make significant use of highly compliant elastomer hinges, a fast, accurate modeling method for these hinges was desired for mechanism characterization and design. An analytical model was developed for this purpose, making use of the pseudo rigid-body (PRB) model and extending its utility to hinges with significant stretch component, such as those fabricated from elastomer materials. This model includes 3 springs with stiffnesses relating to material stiffness and hinge geometry, with additional correction factors for aspects particular to common multi-material hinge geometry. This model has been verified against a finite element analysis model (FEA), which in turn was matched to experimental data on mesoscale hinges manufactured using LaCER. These modeling methods have additionally been verified against experimental data from microscale hinges manufactured using the Si/elastomer/magnetics MEMS process. The development of several mechanisms is also discussed: including a mesoscale LaCER-fabricated hexapedal millirobot capable of walking at 2.4 body lengths per second; prototyped mesoscale LaCER-fabricated underactuated legs with asymmetrical features for improved performance; 1 centimeter cubed LaCER-fabricated magnetically-actuated hexapods which use the best-performing underactuated leg design to locomote at up to 10.6 body lengths per second; five microfabricated magnetically actuated single-hinge mechanisms; a 14-hinge, 11-link microfabricated gripper mechanism; a microfabricated robot leg mechansim demonstrated clearing a step height of 100 micrometers; and a 4 mm x 4 mm x 5 mm, 25 mg microfabricated magnetically-actuated hexapod, demonstrated walking at up to 2.25 body lengths per second.

Essays in Market Design

In this dissertation, I study three problems in market design: the allocation of resources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of traffic congestion. I show how institutional and behavioral considerations specific to each problem can alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of traffic congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is effective. In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a different school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment algorithms assume resources are fixed. I show how simple modifications to these algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools. In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor markets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring firms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible to eliminate these incentives for the hiring firms in markets without negotiation of salaries. Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an efficient distribution of traffic congestion on a road network. Traffic congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory, Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would effectively be new taxes that would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to construct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigouvian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust observations in experimental economics.