A (More) Livable Community: Community, Cooperative Economics, and Resistance At A Student Housing Cooperative In College Park

Radical thinkers and activists have put forth “building community” as a political alternative, but what does “building community” actually entail? This thesis examines how a student cohousing group in College Park builds community in a rapidly changing college town. The group was founded to help house low-income tenants in the face of increasingly unaffordable housing. I ask how the group creates organizational structures and personal relationships that give rise to alternative housing opportunities. I examine how community shapes, and is shaped by, features of cohousing such as democratic decision-making and cooperative economics. I give particular attention to tensions that occur within the cooperative due to faults in democratic decision-making, the ability to perform cooperative duties, and the demographic makeup of the cooperative. Finally, I ask what transformative features, if any, the community possesses in the face of the city’s development.

Essays in Market Design

In this dissertation, I study three problems in market design: the allocation of resources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of traffic congestion. I show how institutional and behavioral considerations specific to each problem can alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of traffic congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is effective. In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a different school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment algorithms assume resources are fixed. I show how simple modifications to these algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools. In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor markets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring firms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible to eliminate these incentives for the hiring firms in markets without negotiation of salaries. Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an efficient distribution of traffic congestion on a road network. Traffic congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory, Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would effectively be new taxes that would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to construct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigouvian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust observations in experimental economics.

Agriculture, Environmental Incentive Payments, and Water Quality in the Chesapeake Bay

Nonpoint sources (NPS) pollution from agriculture is the leading source of water quality impairment in U.S. rivers and streams, and a major contributor to lakes, wetlands, estuaries and coastal waters (U.S. EPA 2016). Using data from a survey of farmers in Maryland, this dissertation examines the effects of a cost sharing policy designed to encourage adoption of conservation practices that reduce NPS pollution in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. This watershed is the site of the largest Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) implemented to date, making it an important setting in the U.S. for water quality policy. I study two main questions related to the reduction of NPS pollution from agriculture. First, I examine the issue of additionality of cost sharing payments by estimating the direct effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of cover crops, and the indirect effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of two other practices: conservation tillage and contour/strip cropping. A two-stage simultaneous equation approach is used to correct for voluntary self-selection into cost sharing programs and account for substitution effects among conservation practices. Quasi-random Halton sequences are employed to solve the system of equations for conservation practice acreage and to minimize the computational burden involved. By considering patterns of agronomic complementarity or substitution among conservation practices (Blum et al., 1997; USDA SARE, 2012), this analysis estimates water quality impacts of the crowding-in or crowding-out of private investment in conservation due to public incentive payments. Second, I connect the econometric behavioral results with model parameters from the EPA’s Chesapeake Bay Program to conduct a policy simulation on water quality effects. I expand the econometric model to also consider the potential loss of vegetative cover due to cropland incentive payments, or slippage (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez, 2011). Econometric results are linked with the Chesapeake Bay Program watershed model to estimate the change in abatement levels and costs for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment under various behavioral scenarios. Finally, I use inverse sampling weights to derive statewide abatement quantities and costs for each of these pollutants, comparing these with TMDL targets for agriculture in Maryland.

THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVATION ON EMOTION REGULATION AND MOTOR PERFORMANCE: EXAMINATION OF A NEURO-AFFECTIVE MODEL

Mental stress is known to disrupt the execution of motor performance and can lead to decrements in the quality of performance, however, individuals have shown significant differences regarding how fast and well they can perform a skilled task according to how well they can manage stress and emotion. The purpose of this study was to advance our understanding of how the brain modulates emotional reactivity under different motivational states to achieve differential performance in a target shooting task that requires precision visuomotor coordination. In order to study the interactions in emotion regulatory brain areas (i.e. the ventral striatum, amygdala, prefrontal cortex) and the autonomic nervous system, reward and punishment interventions were employed and the resulting behavioral and physiological responses contrasted to observe the changes in shooting performance (i.e. shooting accuracy and stability of aim) and neuro-cognitive processes (i.e. cognitive load and reserve) during the shooting task. Thirty-five participants, aged 18 to 38 years, from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corp (ROTC) at the University of Maryland were recruited to take 30 shots at a bullseye target in three different experimental conditions. In the reward condition, $1 was added to their total balance for every 10-point shot. In the punishment condition, $1 was deducted from their total balance if they did not hit the 10-point area. In the neutral condition, no money was added or deducted from their total balance. When in the reward condition, which was reportedly most enjoyable and least stressful of the conditions, heart rate variability was found to be positively related to shooting scores, inversely related to variability in shooting performance and positively related to alpha power (i.e. less activation) in the left temporal region. In the punishment (and most stressful) condition, an increase in sympathetic response (i.e. increased LF/HF ratio) was positively related to jerking movements as well as variability of placement (on the target) in the shots taken. This, coupled with error monitoring activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, suggests evaluation of self-efficacy might be driving arousal regulation, thus affecting shooting performance. Better performers showed variable, increasing high-alpha power in the temporal region during the aiming period towards taking the shot which could indicate an adaptive strategy of engagement. They also showed lower coherence during hit shots than missed shots which was coupled with reduced jerking movements and better precision and accuracy. Frontal asymmetry measures revealed possible influence of the prefrontal lobe in driving this effect in reward and neutral conditions. The possible interactions, reasons behind these findings and implications are discussed.

Behavioral Response to Environmental Taxation: Evidence from the Transportation Sector

This dissertation analyzes how individuals respond to the introduction of taxation aimed to reduce vehicle pollution, greenhouse gases and traffic. The first chapter analyzes a vehicle registration tax based on emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a major greenhouse gas, adopted in the UK in 2001 and subject to major changes in the following years. I identify the impact of the policy on new vehicle registrations and carbon emissions, compared to alternative measures. Results show that consumers respond to the tax by purchasing cleaner cars, but a carbon tax generating the same revenue would further reduce carbon emissions. The second chapter looks at a pollution charge (polluting vehicles pay to enter the city) and a congestion charge (all vehicles pay) adopted in 2008 and 2011 in Milan, Italy, and how they affected the concentration of nitrogen dioxides (NOx). I use data from pollution monitoring stations to measure the change between areas adopting the tax and other areas. Results show that in the first quarter of their introduction, both policies decreased NOx concentration in a range of -8% and -5%, but the effect declines over time, especially in the case of the pollution charge. The third chapter examines a trial conducted in 2005 in the Seattle, WA, area, in which vehicle trips by 276 volunteer households were recorded with a GPS device installed in their vehicles. Households received a monetary endowment which they used to pay a toll for each mile traveled: the toll varied with the time of the day, the day of the week and the type of road used. Using information on driving behavior, I show that in the first week a $0.10 toll per mile reduces the number of miles driven by around 7%, but the effect lasts only few weeks at most. The effect is mainly driven by a reduction in highway miles during trips from work to home, and it is strongly influenced by past driving behavior, income, the size of the initial endowment and the number of children in the household.