Degenerate mixtures of rubidium and ytterbium for engineering open quantum systems

In the last two decades, experimental progress in controlling cold atoms and ions now allows us to manipulate fragile quantum systems with an unprecedented degree of precision. This has been made possible by the ability to isolate small ensembles of atoms and ions from noisy environments, creating truly closed quantum systems which decouple from dissipative channels. However in recent years, several proposals have considered the possibility of harnessing dissipation in open systems, not only to cool degenerate gases to currently unattainable temperatures, but also to engineer a variety of interesting many-body states. This thesis will describe progress made towards building a degenerate gas apparatus that will soon be capable of realizing these proposals. An ultracold gas of ytterbium atoms, trapped by a species-selective lattice will be immersed into a Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC) of rubidium atoms which will act as a bath. Here we describe the challenges encountered in making a degenerate mixture of rubidium and ytterbium atoms and present two experiments performed on the path to creating a controllable open quantum system. The first experiment will describe the measurement of a tune-out wavelength where the light shift of $\Rb{87}$ vanishes. This wavelength was used to create a species-selective trap for ytterbium atoms. Furthermore, the measurement of this wavelength allowed us to extract the dipole matrix element of the $5s \rightarrow 6p$ transition in $\Rb{87}$ with an extraordinary degree of precision. Our method to extract matrix elements has found use in atomic clocks where precise knowledge of transition strengths is necessary to account for minute blackbody radiation shifts. The second experiment will present the first realization of a degenerate Bose-Fermi mixture of rubidium and ytterbium atoms. Using a three-color optical dipole trap (ODT), we were able to create a highly-tunable, species-selective potential for rubidium and ytterbium atoms which allowed us to use $\Rb{87}$ to sympathetically cool $\Yb{171}$ to degeneracy with minimal loss. This mixture is the first milestone creating the lattice-bath system and will soon be used to implement novel cooling schemes and explore the rich physics of dissipation.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).