THE PHYSICS OF IDEAS: INFERRING THE MECHANICS OF OPINION FORMATION FROM MACROSCOPIC STATISTICAL PATTERNS

In a microscopic setting, humans behave in rich and unexpected ways. In a macroscopic setting, however, distinctive patterns of group behavior emerge, leading statistical physicists to search for an underlying mechanism. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the macroscopic patterns of competing ideas in order to discern the mechanics of how group opinions form at the microscopic level. First, we explore the competition of answers in online Q&A (question and answer) boards. We find that a simple individual-level model can capture important features of user behavior, especially as the number of answers to a question grows. Our model further suggests that the wisdom of crowds may be constrained by information overload, in which users are unable to thoroughly evaluate each answer and therefore tend to use heuristics to pick what they believe is the best answer. Next, we explore models of opinion spread among voters to explain observed universal statistical patterns such as rescaled vote distributions and logarithmic vote correlations. We introduce a simple model that can explain both properties, as well as why it takes so long for large groups to reach consensus. An important feature of the model that facilitates agreement with data is that individuals become more stubborn (unwilling to change their opinion) over time. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms for opinion formation in juries, by comparing data to various types of models. We find that different null hypotheses in which jurors do not interact when reaching a decision are in strong disagreement with data compared to a simple interaction model. These findings provide conceptual and mechanistic support for previous work that has found mutual influence can play a large role in group decisions. In addition, by matching our models to data, we are able to infer the time scales over which individuals change their opinions for different jury contexts. We find that these values increase as a function of the trial time, suggesting that jurors and judicial panels exhibit a kind of stubbornness similar to what we include in our model of voting behavior.

A Better Place to Be: Republicanism as an Alternative to the Authoritarianism-Democracy Dichotomy

ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: A BETTER PLACE TO BE: REPUBLICANISM AS AN ALTENATIVE TO THE AUTHORITARIANISM-DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY Christopher Ronald Binetti, Doctor of Philosophy, and 2016 Dissertation directed by: Dr. Charled Frederick Alford, Department of Government and Politics In this dissertation, I argue that in modern or ancient regimes, the simple dichotomy between democracies and autocracies/dictatorships is both factually wrong and problematic for policy purposes. It is factually wrong because regimes between the two opposite regime types exist and it is problematic because the either/or dichotomy leads to extreme thinking in terms of nation-building in places like Afghanistan. In planning for Afghanistan, the argument is that either we can quickly nation-build it into a liberal democracy or else we must leave it in the hands of a despotic dictator. This is a false choice created by both a faulty categorization of regime types and most importantly, a failure to understand history. History shows us that the republic is a regime type that defies the authoritarian-democracy dichotomy. A republic by my definition is a non-dominating regime, characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness. Thus, a republic is a system of government that has institutions, laws, norms, attitudes, and beliefs that minimize the violation of the rule of law and monopolization of power by one individual or group as much as possible. These norms, laws, attitudes, and beliefs ae essential to the republican system in that they make those institutions that check and balance power work. My four cases are Assyria, Persia, Venice and Florence. Assyria and Persia are ancient regimes, the first was a republic and then became the frightening opposite of a republic, while the latter was a good republic for a long time, but had effectiveness issues towards the end. Venice is a classical example of a medieval or early modern republic, which was very inspirational to Madison and others in building republican America. Florence is the example of a medieval republic that fell to despotism, as immortalized by Machiavelli’s writings. In all of these examples, I test certain alternative hypotheses as well as my own.