Essays in Personal Transportation Demand and Consumer Finance

This dissertation is composed of three essays covering two areas of interest. The first topic is personal transportation demand with a focus on price and fuel efficiency elasticities of mileage demand, challenging assumptions common in the rebound effect literature. The second topic is consumer finance with a focus on small loans. The first chapter creates separate variables for fuel prices during periods of increasing and decreasing prices as well as an observed fuel economy measure to empirically test the equivalence of these elasticities. Using a panel from Germany from 1997 to 2009 I find a fuel economy elasticity of mileage of 53.3%, which is significantly different from the gas price elasticity of mileage during periods of decreasing gas prices, 4.8%. I reject the null hypothesis or price symmetry, with the elasticity of mileage during period of increasing gas prices ranging from 26.2% and 28.9%. The second chapter explores the potential for the rebound effect to vary with income. Panel data from U.S. households from 1997 to 2003 is used to estimate the rebound effect in a median regression. The estimated rebound effect independent of income ranges from 17.8% to 23.6%. An interaction of income and fuel economy is negative and significant, indicating that the rebound effect may be much higher for low income individuals and decreases with income; the rebound effect for low income households ranged from 80.3% to 105.0%, indicating that such households may increase gasoline consumption given an improvement in fuel economy. The final chapter documents the costs of credit instruments found in major mail order catalogs throughout the 20th century. This study constructs a new dataset and finds that the cost of credit increased and became stickier as mail order retailers switched from an installment-style closed-end loan to a revolving-style credit card. This study argues that revolving credit's ability to decrease salience of credit costs in the price of goods is the best explanation for rate stickiness in the mail order industry as well as for the preference of revolving credit among retailers.

Essays on Supply Chain Finance

I study how a larger party within a supply chain could use its superior knowledge about its partner, who is considered to be financially constrained, to help its partner gain access to cheap finance. In particular, I consider two scenarios: (i) Retailer intermediation in supplier finance and (ii) The Effectiveness of Supplier Buy Back Finance. In the fist chapter, I study how a large buyer could help small suppliers obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. In order to reduce channel costs, in recent years large buyers started to implement their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, I analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, I show that buyer intermediated financing can significantly improve supply chain performance. Using data from a large Chinese online retailer and through structural regression estimation based on the theoretical analysis, I demonstrate that buyer intermediation induces lower interest rates and wholesale prices, increases order quantities, and boosts supplier borrowing. The analysis also shows that the retailer systematically overestimates the consumer demand. Based on counterfactual analysis, I predict that the implementation of buyer intermediated financing for the online retailer in 2013 improved channel profits by 18.3%, yielding more than $68M projected savings. In the second chapter, I study a novel buy-back financing scheme employed by large manufacturers in some emerging markets. A large manufacturer can secure financing for its budget-constrained downstream partners by assuming a part of the risk for their inventory by committing to buy back some unsold units. Buy back commitment could help a small downstream party secure a bank loan and further induce a higher order quantity through better allocation of risk in the supply chain. However, such a commitment may undermine the supply chain performance as it imposes extra costs on the supplier incurred by the return of large or costly-to-handle items. I first theoretically analyze the buy-back financing contract employed by a leading Chinese automative manufacturer and some variants of this contracting scheme. In order to measure the effectiveness of buy-back financing contracts, I utilize contract and sales data from the company and structurally estimate the theoretical model. Through counterfactual analysis, I study the efficiency of various buy-back financing schemes and compare them to traditional financing methods. I find that buy-back contract agreements can improve channel efficiency significantly compared to simple contracts with no buy-back, whether the downstream retailer can secure financing on its own or not.