Chinese Intellectuals and China`s Policy toward Japan

This dissertation aims at integrating two scholarships: state-society relation studies and Chinese foreign policy analysis. I created Two-level Perception Gap Model to analyze different intellectual groups' relations with party-state by confirming Chinese intellectuals play a role in CFP making in general, China's Japan policy in particular. This model is an alternative approach, instead of conventional wisdom patron-client approach, to explain and analyze the pluralized intellectual-state relations in China. This model first analyzed the role of two intellectual groups, namely think tank scholars and popular nationalist, in China's Japan policy making, and then based on these analyses it explains the interactional patterns between these two intellectual groups and party-state. I used three case studies, which represented different types of issue, Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, to examine this model. First, I examined think tank scholar groups and the extent they influenced "core interest issue and sensitive issue (Issue 1)," Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy, and their international patterns with party-state. Chapter 3 compares the responses of Chinese officials to the changes in the defense policy of Japan to the analyses from the think tank scholars. As the model assumes, results show that think tank scholars' analyses are consistent with China's policy position; nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm their analyses have influence on Chinese attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense policy. Based on the analysis of journal articles, most articles do not provide policy suggestions or simply provide suggestions that do not deviate from the policy. As Gu's theory of pluralist institutionalism and my hypothesis points out, most think tank scholars are establishment intellectuals so they tend to be self-disciplined. Second, this model provide a new concept "patriotic dilemma" for analyzing the challenge and constraints brought by popular nationalist discourses and public mobilization to Chinese foreign policy decision makers. Chapter 4 investigated the cases study of the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine Visit, defined as "major/minor interest issue/ sensitive issue (Issue 3)," and the discourses from the popular nationalist, mainly focusing on anti-Japanese activists. The chapter also observes their influence on nationalist public opinions and analyzes how the nationalist public opinions constrain the policy choices among decision makers. Results strongly supported the hypothesis of patriotic dilemma that, although the popular nationalist group and public opinions constrained the policy choices of Chinese decision makers in the short term, they were unable to change the fundamental policy direction. Third, chapter 5 also focuses on anti-Japanese activists and examines the model with the case of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The result supported that hypothesis that China's policy change was not because of the influence from popular nationalist's discourses or public opinions but because of the change of priority of this issue, from major/minor interest issue to core interest issue. These two chapters also indicate that the patron-client model is unable to describe the popular nationalist. An alternative approach, such as the concept "patriotic dilemma" is needed to describe the relations between the popular nationalist and the government.

Convention, Tradition, and the New Wave : Assessing Clinician Identity within Behavior Therapy

In the first wave, behaviorists questioned the conventional wisdom that inner experience was relevant to understanding human behavior. In the 1970s, cognitive-behavioral theories emphasized the importance of the cognitive element, not just the environment, in explaining and modifying behavior. The third wave is drawn from advances in basic and applied behavior analysis of language, Eastern mystical traditions, and less empirically oriented therapeutic approaches. Examples include Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP), and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (IBCT). This study reports a survey of clinicians and non-clinicians who self-identify with second or third wave approaches, and a group of undergraduate psychology students intended to represent a layperson or folk psychological approach. Their preferences, in the context of 10 clinical vignettes, among 5 different therapeutic responses or interventions that included "ACT-like," "cognitive," and commonsense or "neutral" options were measured. Third wave-oriented respondents exhibited more consistency than others in their preference for interventions that match their self-identified theoretical orientation, however the author suggests that construction of the vignettes may have influenced this result.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.