An Empirical Comparison of Reuse in Embedded and Nonembedded Systems

High-quality software, delivered on time and budget, constitutes a critical part of most products and services in modern society. Our government has invested billions of dollars to develop software assets, often to redevelop the same capability many times. Recognizing the waste involved in redeveloping these assets, in 1992 the Department of Defense issued the Software Reuse Initiative. The vision of the Software Reuse Initiative was "To drive the DoD software community from its current "re-invent the software" cycle to a process-driven, domain-specific, architecture-centric, library-based way of constructing software.'' Twenty years after issuing this initiative, there is evidence of this vision beginning to be realized in nonembedded systems. However, virtually every large embedded system undertaken has incurred large cost and schedule overruns. Investigations into the root cause of these overruns implicates reuse. Why are we seeing improvements in the outcomes of these large scale nonembedded systems and worse outcomes in embedded systems? This question is the foundation for this research. The experiences of the Aerospace industry have led to a number of questions about reuse and how the industry is employing reuse in embedded systems. For example, does reuse in embedded systems yield the same outcomes as in nonembedded systems? Are the outcomes positive? If the outcomes are different, it may indicate that embedded systems should not use data from nonembedded systems for estimation. Are embedded systems using the same development approaches as nonembedded systems? Does the development approach make a difference? If embedded systems develop software differently from nonembedded systems, it may mean that the same processes do not apply to both types of systems. What about the reuse of different artifacts? Perhaps there are certain artifacts that, when reused, contribute more or are more difficult to use in embedded systems. Finally, what are the success factors and obstacles to reuse? Are they the same in embedded systems as in nonembedded systems? The research in this dissertation is comprised of a series of empirical studies using professionals in the aerospace and defense industry as its subjects. The main focus has been to investigate the reuse practices of embedded systems professionals and nonembedded systems professionals and compare the methods and artifacts used against the outcomes. The research has followed a combined qualitative and quantitative design approach. The qualitative data were collected by surveying software and systems engineers, interviewing senior developers, and reading numerous documents and other studies. Quantitative data were derived from converting survey and interview respondents' answers into coding that could be counted and measured. From the search of existing empirical literature, we learned that reuse in embedded systems are in fact significantly different from nonembedded systems, particularly in effort in model based development approach and quality where the development approach was not specified. The questionnaire showed differences in the development approach used in embedded projects from nonembedded projects, in particular, embedded systems were significantly more likely to use a heritage/legacy development approach. There was also a difference in the artifacts used, with embedded systems more likely to reuse hardware, test products, and test clusters. Nearly all the projects reported using code, but the questionnaire showed that the reuse of code brought mixed results. One of the differences expressed by the respondents to the questionnaire was the difficulty in reuse of code for embedded systems when the platform changed. The semistructured interviews were performed to tell us why the phenomena in the review of literature and the questionnaire were observed. We asked respected industry professionals, such as senior fellows, fellows and distinguished members of technical staff, about their experiences with reuse. We learned that many embedded systems used heritage/legacy development approaches because their systems had been around for many years, before models and modeling tools became available. We learned that reuse of code is beneficial primarily when the code does not require modification, but, especially in embedded systems, once it has to be changed, reuse of code yields few benefits. Finally, while platform independence is a goal for many in nonembedded systems, it is certainly not a goal for the embedded systems professionals and in many cases it is a detriment. However, both embedded and nonembedded systems professionals endorsed the idea of platform standardization. Finally, we conclude that while reuse in embedded systems and nonembedded systems is different today, they are converging. As heritage embedded systems are phased out, models become more robust and platforms are standardized, reuse in embedded systems will become more like nonembedded systems.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

The Rueter-Hess Dam and Reservoir Project: A Question of Sustainable Water

Water in sufficient quantities throughout the Colorado Front Range is becoming increasingly limited. This paper examines the consequences for continued unsustainable use of water for communities of the Denver metropolitan area. This paper also looks at the effect that water law in the West has for otherwise optimum distributions of water. In addition, four regional and state water studies are reviewed for their contribution to sustainable water. Finally, the Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Rueter-Hess dam and reservoir project in Parker, Colorado is explored. Key findings conclude that the Rueter-Hess project may not, by itself, provide sustainable water for Parker; but the project will create incentive and opportunity for communities throughout the region to address the question of sustainable water.