An Introduction to Conservation Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law

The idea of a conservation easement – restrictions on the development and use of land designed to protect the land’s conservation or historic values – can be relatively easily understood. More significant and more challenging is the complex body of state and federal laws that shapes the creation, funding, tax treatment, enforcement, modification, and termination of conservation easements. The explosion in the number of conservation easements over the past four decades has made them one of the most popular land protection mechanisms in the United States. The National Conservation Easement Database estimates that the total number of acres encumbered by conservation easements exceeds 40 million.Because conservation easements are both novel and ubiquitous, understanding how they actual work is essential for practicing lawyers, policymakers, land trust professionals, and students of conservation. This article provides a “quick tour” through some of the most important aspects of the developing mosaic of conservation easement law. It gives the reader a sense of the complex inter-jurisdictional dynamics that shape conservation transactions and disputes about conservation easements. Professors of property law, environmental law, tax law, and environmental studies who wish to cover conservation easements in the context of a more general course can use the article to provide their students with a broad but comprehensive overview of the relevant legal and policy issues.

The Life of Crimmigration Law

This short essay introduces a collection of articles that arose from the Denver University Law Review’s symposium Crimmigration: Crossing the Border Between Criminal Law and Immigration Law, held in February 2015 at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The essay borrows heavily from the Epilogue to my book Crimmigration Law.

The Perks of Playing Dress-Up: Psychological Impressions of Fashion and Feminism.

Research on the psychological impact of women's fashion has focused on fashion's negative influence over how women think and feel about themselves. Several studies have examined the relationship between fashion and women's self-appraisals (Martin & Gentry, 1997; Pinhas, Toner, Ali, Garfinkel, & Stuckless, 1999; Tiggemann, Polivy, & Hargreaves, 2009), although few investigations have explored the range of viewpoints that arise when women interact with their own personal style or with other forms of fashion media. This paper presents a narrative review of what has been written about fashion in clinical research. I briefly discuss why this is an important topic and why fashion has psychological meaning. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is considered in the exploration of fashion's impact on conjuring unproductive and productive schemas (Beck, 1976; Wright, Basco, & Thase, 2006). This discussion includes a presentation of interviews with female consultants, hypothetical examples, my own accounts, and feminist perspectives. While emphasizing the potential biases of women's interactions with fashion, I discuss matters of gender performance and reflections on clinical work. The purpose of this article is to present a pro-social defense of fashion. I do this by acquiring personal chronicles, applying those findings to the current body of research, and adding to the continued investigation of why women's fashion is still important in a postfeminist world.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.