Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships

This Article uses the example of BigLaw firms to explore the challenges that many elite organizations face in providing equal opportunity to their workers. Despite good intentions and the investment of significant resources, large law firms have been consistently unable to deliver diverse partnership structures - especially in more senior positions of power. Building on implicit and institutional bias scholarship and on successful approaches described in the organizational behavior literature, we argue that a significant barrier to systemic diversity at the law firm partnership level has been, paradoxically, the insistence on difference blindness standards that seek to evaluate each person on their individual merit. While powerful in dismantling intentional discrimination, these standards rely on an assumption that lawyers are, and have the power to act as, atomistic individuals - a dangerous assumption that has been disproven consistently by the literature establishing the continuing and powerful influence of implicit and institutional bias. Accordingly, difference blindness, which holds all lawyers accountable to seemingly neutral standards, disproportionately disadvantages diverse populations and normalizes the dominance of certain actors - here, white men - by creating the illusion that success or failure depends upon individual rather than structural constraints. In contrast, we argue that a bias awareness approach that encourages identity awareness and a relational framework is a more promising way to promote equality, equity, and inclusion.

The Jewish Law Firm: Past and Present

The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in New York City during the second half of the twentieth century was nothing short of an astounding success story. As late as 1950, there was not a single large Jewish law firm in town. By the mid-1960s, six of the largest twenty law firms were Jewish, and by 1980, four of the largest ten prestigious law firms were Jewish firms. Moreover, the accomplishment of the Jewish firms is especially striking because, while the traditional large White Anglo-Saxon Protestant law firms grew at a fast rate during this period, the Jewish firms grew twice as fast, and they did so in spite of experiencing explicit discrimination. What happened? This book chapter is a revised, updated study of the rise and growth of large New York City Jewish law firms. It is based on the public record, with respect to both the law firms themselves and trends in the legal profession generally, and on over twenty in-depth interviews with lawyers who either founded and practiced at these successful Jewish firms, attempted and failed to establish such firms, or were in a position to join these firms but decided instead to join WASP firms. According to the informants interviewed in this chapter, while Jewish law firms benefited from general decline in anti-Semitism and increased demand for corporate legal services, a unique combination of factors explains the incredible rise of the Jewish firms. First, white-shoe ethos caused large WASP firms to stay out of undignified practice areas and effectively created pockets of Jewish practice areas, where the Jewish firms encountered little competition for their services. Second, hiring and promotion discriminatory practices by the large WASP firms helped create a large pool of talented Jewish lawyers from which the Jewish firms could easily recruit. Finally, the Jewish firms benefited from a flip side of bias phenomenon, that is, they benefited from the positive consequences of stereotyping. Paradoxically, the very success of the Jewish firms is reflected in their demise by the early twenty-first century: because systematic large law firm ethno-religious discrimination against Jewish lawyers has become a thing of the past, the very reason for the existence of Jewish law firms has been nullified. As other minority groups, however, continue to struggle for equality within the senior ranks of Big Law, can the experience of the Jewish firms serve as a “separate-but-equal” blueprint for overcoming contemporary forms of discrimination for women, racial, and other minority attorneys? Perhaps not. As this chapter establishes, the success of large Jewish law firms was the result of unique conditions and circumstances between 1945 and 1980, which are unlikely to be replicated. For example, large law firms have become hyper-competitive and are not likely to allow any newcomers the benefit of protected pockets of practice. While smaller “separate-but-equal” specialized firms, for instance, ones exclusively hiring lawyer-mothers occasionally appear, the rise of large “separate-but-equal” firms is improbable.

BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink and Blue, Black and White

This Article advances a new capital framework for understanding the bargain between large law firms and their lawyers, depicting BigLaw relationships not as basic labor-salary exchanges but rather as complex transactions in which large law firms and their lawyers exchange labor and various forms of capital — social, cultural, and identity. First, it builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu regarding economic, cultural, symbolic, and social capital by examining the concepts of positive and negative capital, exploring the meaning of capital ownership by entities, and developing the notion of identity capital — the value individuals and institutions derive from their identities. Then, the Article advances a capital theory of BigLaw, in which large law firms and their lawyers engage in complex transactions trading labor, social, cultural, and identity capital for economic, social, cultural, and identity capital. Capital analysis sheds new light on the well-documented and troubling underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at BigLaw. It shows that the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers is not solely the result of exogenous forces outside the control of large law firms such as implicit bias, but rather the outcome of the very exchanges in which BigLaw and its lawyers engage. Specifically, large law firms take into account the capital endowments of their lawyers in making hiring, retention and promotion decisions, and derive value from their lawyers’ capital, for example, by trading on the identity of women and minority lawyers in marketing themselves as being diverse and inclusive to clients and potential recruits. Yet, while BigLaw trades for the identity capital of women and minority lawyers, it fails to offer them opportunities in return to acquire the social and cultural capital necessary for attaining positions of power, resulting in underrepresentation. Moreover, these labor-capital exchanges are often implicit and made by uninformed participants, and therefore unjust. Exactly because the capital framework describes the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at BigLaw as an endogenous outcome within the control of BigLaw and its lawyers, however, it is a cautiously optimistic model that offers hope for greater representation of diverse lawyers in positions of power and influence. The Article suggests policies and procedures BigLaw can and should adopt to improve the quality of the exchanges it offers to women and minority attorneys and to reduce the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers within its ranks. Employing the concepts of capital transparency, capital boundary, and capital infrastructure, it demonstrates how BigLaw can (1) explicitly recognize the roles social, cultural, and identity capital play in its hiring, retention and promotion apparatuses and (2) revise its policies and procedures to ensure that all of its lawyers have equal opportunities to develop the requisite capital and compete on equal and fair terms for positions of power and influence.

In-House Risk

Over the last thirty years or so, as the number of in-house counsel rose and their role increased in scope and prominence, increased attention has been given the various challenges these lawyers face under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, from figuring out who is the client the in-house lawyer represents, to navigating conflicts of interest, maintaining independence, and engaging in a multijurisdictional practice of law. Less attention, to date, has been given to business risk assessment, perhaps in part because that function appears to be part of in-house counsel’s role as a business person rather than as a lawyer. Overlooking the role of in-house counsel in assessing risk, however, is a risky proposition, because risk assessment constitutes for some in-house counsel a significant aspect of their role, a role that in turn informs and shapes how in-house counsel perform other more overtly legal tasks. For example, wearing her hat as General Counsel, a lawyer for the entity-client may opine and explain issues of compliance with the law. Wearing her hat as the Chief Legal Officer, however, the same lawyer may now be called upon as a member of business management to participate in the decision whether to comply with the law. After outlining some of the traditional challenges faced by in-house counsel under the Rules, this short essay explores risk assessment by in-house counsel and its impact on their role and function under the Rules. It argues that the key to in-house lawyers’ successful navigation of multiple roles, and, in particular, to their effective assessment of business risk is keen awareness of the various hats they are called upon to wear. Navigating these various roles may not be easy for lawyers, whose training and habits of mind often teach them to zoom in on legal risks to the exclusion of business risks. Indeed, law schools continue to teach law students “to think like a lawyer” and law firms, the historical breeding grounds for in-house counsel positions, in a world of increased specialization master the narrower contemplation of legal questions. Yet the present and future of in-house counsel practice demand of its practitioners the careful and gradual coming to terms, buildup and mastery of business risk analysis skills, alongside the cultivation of traditional legal risk analysis tools.