Becoming a State: Zionist and Palestinian Movements for National Liberation

This study examines the road to statehood for the Zionist and Palestinian movements. There are three components which frame this investigation: 1. social movements and the practices in which they engage that are aimed at establishing statehood for a people; 2. distinctive configurations of the international system and the manner in which both the material and ideational foundations of that system pulls units towards conformity and predictable behavior; and finally, 3. the role of agency, that is, the way in which instrumentally rational individuals attempt to push the structure in which they are embedded towards a configuration that is better suited to their interests and objectives The most influential factor guiding these struggles for national liberation are those forces which emanate from the prevailing structure of the international system. Not only was it demonstrated that the established material and ideational preferences of existing states have strong bearing on a movement’s ideological orientation and by consequence its chosen course of struggle, but hegemonic order configurations also define political cleavages and in so doing present movement leaders with both tactical and strategic opportunities by harnessing or exploiting those cleavages. From the agency perspective, the cases showed that the leadership of each movement was highly influential in the determination of a movement’s success or failure.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.