Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused Analysis of Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998-2011

This research project examines the role of electoral system rules in affecting the extent of conciliatory behavior and cross-ethnic coalition making in Northern Ireland. It focuses on the role of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system in shaping party and voter incentives in a post-conflict divided society. The research uses a structured, focused comparison of the four electoral cycles since the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This enables a systematic examination of each electoral cycle using a common set of criteria focused on conciliation and cross-ethnic coalition making. Whilst preference voting is assumed to benefit moderate candidates, in Northern Ireland centrist and multi-ethnic parties outside of the dominant ethnic communities have received little electoral success. In Northern Ireland the primary effect of STV has not been to encourage inter-communal voting but to facilitate intra-community and intra-party moderation. STV has encouraged the moderation of the historically extreme political parties in each of the ethnic bloc. Patterns across electoral cycles suggest that party elites from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein have moderated their policy positions due to the electoral system rules. Therefore they have pursued lower-preference votes from within their ethnic bloc but in doing so have marginalized parties of a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic orientation.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.