The First Child In A Chinese Family Who Could Read Prior To Entry Into Elementary School: A Qualitative Intrinsic Case Study

ABSTRACT This study is an account of the literacy-related human environment a Chinese girl experienced as the first person in the history of her family who was able to read prior to entry into elementary school. Temporally speaking, the study spanned more than a decade from the initial, tentative research question to the formal, primary research question. Spatially speaking, it crossed three cultures: the Chinese, Korean, and American cultures. The study was inspired by the Zero Project in China, known as the "Project of Quality Education and Implementation for Children Aged Zero (fetus) to Six." The significance of the content issue in a child's literacy curriculum was explored in an interdisciplinary way. Case study served as a holistic research approach and provided the researcher with free temporal and spatial distance to pursue the indefinably multi-dimensional intricacies of a child's early literacy acquisition among generations in the family. Interpretation of the case was based on the relevant concepts within the scope of the researcher's knowledge of Chinese culture. Major findings revealed that the child's literacy acquisition was inseparably related to her parents' background as well as their awareness of and attitudes towards literacy, and that the foundation of all this was the harmony of the family. Through the lens of generational attitudes towards literacy and especially the lens of the researcher's multicultural life experiences, this study contributes to the field of curriculum studies in general and early literacy curriculum in particular by stimulating people to reconsider what to read to children, besides how to read to them. It calls attention once again to the classic curriculum question, "What knowledge is of most worth?" as well as what is the most essential spiritual food human beings need besides physical needs. This study suggests that Chinese philosophy should be included in a child's early literacy curriculum in China and calls for dialogues on the content issue of curriculum to gain a deeper understanding of human nature so that humans might co-live peacefully with all beings in the universe.

PTSD, Depression, and Substance Abuse Symptoms in Women Exposed to Intimate Partner Abuse

The present study explores relationships among several established correlates of trauma in women exposed to intimate partner abuse (IPA), including PTSD, depression, and dissociation symptoms as well as alcohol use as well as other trauma-related variables, such as social support and violence exposure. Two analysis methods were utilized: variable-oriented methods, which examine relationships between variables, and person-oriented analysis methods, which examine groupings of participants within a larger sample (N = 233). Results of the variable-oriented analyses indicated positive links among depression, PTSD, dissociation, and alcohol use in women exposed to IPA, as well as positive links between the aforementioned psychological symptoms and exposure to violence. Social support was related to decreased psychological symptoms. Person-oriented analyses indicated the presence of four unique profiles of women within the larger study sample: Profile 1 (n = 21), which was labeled High Dissociation, Low Depression/PTSD; Profile 2 (n = 150), which was labeled Low Symptoms, High Social Support, Profile 3 (n = 41); which was labeled Low Dissociation, High Depression/PTSD; and Profile 4 (n = 22), which was labeled High Symptoms, Low Social Support. This research supports previous findings about the relationships among several variables related to IPA as well as suggests the need for careful consideration of differences among women within the larger context of research, advocacy, and clinical interventions related to IPA.

I'm Not Who I Thought I Was: A Contextual Resolution to the Identity Loss of Combat PTSD.

Given the historical rates of combat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), one can expect 30% of soldiers returning from current military conflicts to suffer from PTSD. For these individuals, various cognitive behavioral therapies (CBT) are the most commonly employed treatments. Unfortunately, however, symptom relapse can be expected with the various CBT approaches, as traumatic memories remain. Soldiers are imbued with a militarized identity, and the identity loss experienced by those soldiers who suffer from PTSD is particularly painful for this population, as the militarized identity effectively disavows personal suffering. For this reason, many combat veterans diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder experience undue, prolonged suffering as they struggle to make sense of the different person they fear they have become. This paper contrasts certain versions of Western philosophy, which view the self as a fixed and reified entity with certain versions of Eastern philosophy, which view the self as more contextual and fluid, in order to illuminate the value of employing third wave behavioral treatments, specifically Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), to treat the identity loss experienced by military veterans with PTSD. ACT echoes the Buddhist principle that attachment to verbally-constructed conceptual notions of self contribute to undue suffering, and that more vital living can be achieved by assuming a more contextual and experiential perspective on identity. Research and anecdotal accounts are cited to illustrate why treatment for identity loss associated with combat PTSD should be less focused on reconstructing a historically substance-oriented self and more focused on an epistemological reorientation to a deconstructed, contextual self.

Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships

This Article uses the example of BigLaw firms to explore the challenges that many elite organizations face in providing equal opportunity to their workers. Despite good intentions and the investment of significant resources, large law firms have been consistently unable to deliver diverse partnership structures - especially in more senior positions of power. Building on implicit and institutional bias scholarship and on successful approaches described in the organizational behavior literature, we argue that a significant barrier to systemic diversity at the law firm partnership level has been, paradoxically, the insistence on difference blindness standards that seek to evaluate each person on their individual merit. While powerful in dismantling intentional discrimination, these standards rely on an assumption that lawyers are, and have the power to act as, atomistic individuals - a dangerous assumption that has been disproven consistently by the literature establishing the continuing and powerful influence of implicit and institutional bias. Accordingly, difference blindness, which holds all lawyers accountable to seemingly neutral standards, disproportionately disadvantages diverse populations and normalizes the dominance of certain actors - here, white men - by creating the illusion that success or failure depends upon individual rather than structural constraints. In contrast, we argue that a bias awareness approach that encourages identity awareness and a relational framework is a more promising way to promote equality, equity, and inclusion.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation

This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not the first article to survey some of those cases. This Article includes additional cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings. The Article closely examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law. Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine” — the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the home. Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms, providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner. Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow, through 1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but eventually gave up. Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.