China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

Examining the Alliance-Outcome Relationship: Reverse Causation, Third Variables, and Treatment Phase Artifacts

Psychotherapy research reveals consistent associations between therapeutic alliance and treatment outcomes in the youth and adult literatures. Despite these consistent findings, prospective associations are not sufficient to support the claim that the alliance is a change mechanism in psychotherapy. The current study examined the direction of effect of the alliance- outcome relationship, the contribution of early symptom change in treatment to the development of therapeutic alliance, and the potential for pretreatment interpersonal functioning characteristics to be third variables that account for the association between alliance and outcome. Participants were adolescents with depression and a history of interpersonal trauma that presented to a community mental health center for treatment. Findings demonstrated that a more positive therapeutic alliance predicted greater subsequent symptom improvement, even after removing symptom change occurring before the measurement of alliance. Results also suggested that early change only slightly contributed to alliance development. Finally, though pretreatment interpersonal functioning was related to the first session alliance, these pretreatment client characteristics were not related to later alliance or symptom change. Overall, results provided some support for therapeutic alliance as a mechanism of change in psychotherapy. Methodological and clinical issues are discussed.