Assessment and Promotion of Partner Support: A Prevention-Focused Intervention for Perinatal Depression in Primary Care

Perinatal depression significantly impacts the mother, her partner, the unborn fetus, and the infant/child after delivery. A review of the literature supports the need for preventive intervention methods as research has shown that even with successful treatment, disruptions in attachment, temperament, and cognitive development often remain. Primary care settings are ideal targets for prevention given that they can reach a number of people at low-cost without the stigma associated with seeking help in a mental health facility. This paper purposes a preventive intervention method for perinatal depression that can be implemented in primary care settings in both Western and non-Western countries. The intervention targets two of the primary risk factors for perinatal depression; partner support and relationship quality. The intervention is structured around key target periods in gestational development and during the early weeks after delivery. Suggestions for each target visit are based on prior research that has demonstrated how psychoeducation about the transition to parenthood, as well as increased communication, can positively affect partner support and relationship quality. The ultimate goal of the intervention is not only to prevent perinatal depression but also to improve the mental health and wellbeing of the entire family system.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

FOIA, Inc.

Government transparency is imagined as a public good necessary to a robust democracy. Consistent with that vision, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to allow oversight and accountability of governmental activities. No actors are more central to the design than journalists, who were not only the prime intended users, but who were intimately involved in crafting the law itself. But this democracy-enhancing ideal is at odds with FOIA’s reality: at some agencies, commercial — not public — interests dominate the landscape of FOIA requesters. This Article provides the first in-depth academic study of the commercial use of FOIA, drawing on original datasets from six federal agencies. It uses these agencies as case studies to examine the way that businesses derive profit-making value from free or low-cost federal records. Remarkably, these datasets also reveal a cottage industry of companies whose entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell them at a profit. Information resellers are not isolated occurrences, but rather are some of the most frequent FOIA requesters — often submitting hundreds or even thousands of requests a year — at a variety of federal agencies. Commercial users certainly have legitimate information needs, but, as this Article demonstrates, the volume and character of the current commercial use of FOIA undermines its efficacy as a transparency tool. Private businesses in essence receive a substantial subsidy without any corresponding public good, all while draining agency resources that might otherwise be used to respond to FOIA requests that serve its central oversight and accountability aims. Moreover, information resellers have become the de facto locus for federal records for whole industries, effectively privatizing an important public function. Counter-intuitively, limiting commercial requesting will not solve this problem. Instead, this Article proposes a targeted and aggressive policy of requiring government agencies to affirmatively disclose sets of records that are routinely the subject of FOIA requests — a surprisingly large number of the documents sought by commercial requesters. By meeting information needs in a more efficient manner that is available equally to all, affirmative disclosure will enable federal agencies to reclaim public records from the private market and free up resources to better serve FOIA requests that advance its democratic purpose.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

The Eating Disorder Inventory-III Maturity Fears Scale and Treatment Outcome in an Intensive Outpatient Eating Disorder Program

Eating disorders present a significant physical and psychological problem with a prevalence rate of approximately six percent in the United States. Despite the extensive literature, identifying the consistent risk factors for predicting the course of treatment in eating disorders remains difficult. The present study explores the use of a standardized assessment, using the consistently validated Eating Disorder Inventory-III (EDI-3), in predicting treatment outcome. Specifically, the study investigates the particular scale of Maturity Fears (MF) on the EDI-3, hypothesizing that higher scores on the MF scale would predict lower rates of recovery and treatment completion. The participants were 52 eating disorder patients (19 AN, 18 BN, and 15 EDNOS), consecutively admitted to a five-month long intensive outpatient program (IOP). The participants completed an EDI-3 self-report at pre and post treatment, and their score on the MF scale did not show a significant predictive relationship to treatment completion or change in symptoms, as measured by the Eating Disorder Risk Composite (EDRC) scale on the EDI-3. This finding primarily suggests that maturity fears are not a significant predictive factor in an outpatient setting with adults, as compared to previous studies that found a relationship between maturity fears and treatment outcome, primarily with adolescent and inpatient populations.